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Title VI and the Intent/Impact Debate:
A Critical Look at
"Coextensiveness"
By ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE
Introduction
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 was enacted as part of a
larger package of federal legislation aimed at redressing the wrongs of
past discrimination and at preventing future transgressions against
members of identified groups-most notably racial minorities.2 This
title of the Act-prohibiting discrimination based upon race, color, or
national origin in federally assisted programs or activities-has been
relied upon by private individuals3 and administrative agencies4 to
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Title VI]. Section 2000d
states: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
2. Other parts of the Act prohibit discrimination in voting, § 1971 (Title I); public
accommodations, § 2000a (Title II); public facilities, § 2000b (Title III), public education,
§ 2000c (Title IV); and employment, § 2000e (Title VII). Titles II, III, and IV prohibit
discrimination on the grounds of religion-and Title VII on the grounds of religion and
sex-in addition to race, color, and national origin.
3. While Title VI does not expressly create a private right of action, a majority of the
lower federal courts have either recognized an implied right of action or failed to address the
issue and permitted the litigation to proceed. One of the earliest cases to recognize such a
right was Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 851-52 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967), in which the court recognized plaintiffs' right both under Title
VI and as third party beneficiaries to "contractual assurances" given in writing by the school
district to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW). The Supreme Court
later relied upon this theory in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), as did the Fifth Circuit
in United States v. Marion County School Dist., 625 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1980) (court upheld
right of HEW to sue based upon breach of contractual assurances made by district). Two
more recent opinions of the Supreme Court indicate that this issue still awaits final resolu-
tion. In Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), the Court failed to
resolve this issue, although four Justices were of the view that such a private cause of action
exists under Title VI, id at 408 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and
four Justices assumed it for purposes of this case, id at 269 (Powell, J.), 324 (Brennan,
White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice White,
however, in a separate opinion, stated that an implied private right of action under Title VI
would violate the legislative intent of the Act. Id. at 380-81. The issue has been confused
further by the Court's opinion in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), in
which the Court recognized such a right under Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1981). In Cannon, the Court based its conclusion upon the
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remedy discrimination in education, 5 employment, 6 housing,7 and
more recently in health care and other municipal services.' As a dis-
crimination statute, Title VI draws its congressional enactment author-
ity from section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 As this is a statute
conditioning receipt of federal funds upon compliance with federal
statutory and administrative directives, congressional power is derived
from Article I, section 8 of the Constitution, commonly known as the
fact that Title IX had been modeled after Title VI, with such a right having been recognized
under Title VI in Bakke. The lower courts subsequently have interpreted Cannon as having
placed the Court's final seal of recognition on the private right of action under Title VI. See
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980) (Sifton, J., concurring),
cert. granted, 454 U.S. 1140 (1982); NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d
1247, 1257 (3d Cir. 1979); Brown v. New Haven Civil Serv. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256, 1264 (D.
Conn. 1979); Salomone, Enforcing Educational Rights Through Private Actions: One Step
Beyond Bakke, 8 NOLPE SCH. L.J. 76 (1978); Note, An Implied Private Right ofAction
Under Title V1, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 297 (1980); Comment, CivilRights Title V1-I1s a
Private Right oAction Intended?, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 565 (1980).
4. Title VI grants rulemaking and enforcement powers to federal administrative agen-
cies empowered to extend financial assistance to any program or activity. Section 2000d-l
provides in pertinent part: "Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this
section may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance
under such program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an express find-
ing on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such require-
ment. . . or (2) by any other means authorized by law ...."
5. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Lau v. Nichols,
414 U.S. 563 (1974); United States v. Marion County School Dist., 625 F.2d 607 (5th Cir.
1980); Lora v. Board of Educ., 623 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1980); Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson
High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1979); Sema v. Portales, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th
Cir. 1974); Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
388 U.S. 911 (1967); Valadez v. Graham, 474 F. Supp. 149 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
6. See, e.g., Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979); Otero
v. Mesa County Valley School Dist., 586 F.2d 1312 (10th Cir. 1977); Board of Educ. v.
Califano, 584 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1978), a f'd sub nom. Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130
(1979); Wade v. Mississippi Corp. Extension Serv., 528 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1976); Harris v.
White, 479 F. Supp. 996 (D. Mass. 1979).
7. See, eg., Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 503 F.2d 1236 (6th Cir. 1974); Gautreaux v.
Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971); Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969).
8. See, e.g., NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981); Bryan v.
Koch, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980); Jackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. Mo. 1979);
Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
9. The 14th Amendment was adopted at the close of the Civil War and was designed,
as were the 13th and 15th Amendments, to protect the newly acquired freedom of the black
population. Ratified in 1868, the Amendment defines citizenship, provides that no state may
abridge privileges and immunities of citizens, and forbids states to take life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law or to deny anyone the equal protection of the laws. Sections
one and five are the most relevant to the present discussion.
Section one provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o state shall. . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
Section five provides that "the Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this article." Id § 5.
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"Spending Clause," which provides that "Congress shall have Power
. ..to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general
Welfare of the United States ... ."10
A recent split of judicial authority resulting from the Supreme
Court's 1978 decision in Regents of the University of California v.
BakkeI has placed the broad-based utility of Title VI in serious ques-
tion. In Bakke, five of the Justices held that Title VI is "coterminous"
with the Fourteenth Amendment, 2 that is, that Title VI proscribes only
those racial classifications that are proscribed by the Constitution. This
so-called "doctrine of coextensiveness" has left the lower courts to
grapple with the issue of whether Title VI mandates the constitutional
standard of proof of discriminatory intent as enunciated by the Court in
Washington v. Davis, 3 or merely that of disproportionate impact as uti-
lized by the courts in employment discrimination cases brought under
Title VII." Prior to Bakke, the leading precedent on the standard of
proof in Title VI cases was Lau v. Nichols, 5 in which the Court applied
an effects standard. The question now remaining is whether Bakke
overruled Lau, that is, whether discriminatory intent rather than mere
disproportionate impact is required to establish a prima facie Title VI
case based upon a facially neutral policy having a disparate racial
impact.
The positions taken by the federal appellate courts over the past
several years as to the "doctrine of coextensiveness" and its implica-
tions for the governing standard of review under Title VI offer note-
worthy insights as to possible interpretations. This article will discuss
the intent and impact (effects) standards as they have been developed
by the courts under the Constitution and Title VII-including the evi-
dentiary and policy considerations of each standard-as well as the use
of the prima facie case concept in Title VII litigation and its applicabil-
ity to Title VI. It will further analyze the leading Supreme Court deci-
sions related to the issue, and the standards established by several of
the circuits as to Title VI interpretation. Finally, based upon principles
10. The power of Congress to place conditions upon receipt of federal funds as an in-
ducement to local governments to cooperate with federal civil rights policy is well-settled in
the case law. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Board of Educ. v. Harris,
444 U.S. 130 (1979); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 561 (1974). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONsTrruTIONAL LAW 247-50 (1978).
11. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
12. Id at 325. These five Justices were Powell, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and the
Chief Justice.
13. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Title VII].
15. 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974).
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of statutory construction and policy considerations, it will be suggested
that a general impact standard be applied in Title VI cases. The article
will further suggest the use in Title VI cases of Title VII prima facie
criteria, and will outline a model of proof allocation: that preserves the
underlying legislative purpose: to assure that federal funds are not
used to promote discrimination while allowing limited deference to lo-
cal decisionmaking.
The practical implications of the issue must be underscored. Title
VI is a broad-based civil rights statute barring discrimination not only
in the area of education but in any program or activity receiving feder-
al financial assistance. An intent standard applied in the narrowest
sense would foreclose a substantial group of aggrieved individuals al-
ready denied constitutional relief from obtaining redress in the
courts.' 6 In addition, the language and enforcement procedures for Ti-
tle VI have served as the model for subsequent legislation, prohibiting
sex' 7 and handicap"8 discrimination. Court interpretation of these stat-
utes on certain issues has hinged upon judicial interpretation and the
16. In the field of education, the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, 20
U.S.C. § 1703, does provide an alternative avenue of relief. The statute prohibits a state
from denying equal educational opportunity to an individual on account of race, color, sex,
or national origin in any of six specified ways. Designed essentially as antibusing legislation,
the first five prohibitions are concerned with desegregation and the assignment and transpor-
tation of students. The sixth prohibition, however, was designed to codify into law the
Supreme Court's decision that same year in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), with respect
to the educational rights of linguistic minority students. Subsection (f) of § 1703 prohibits
an educational agency from failing "to take appropriate action to overcome language barri-
ers that impede equal participation by its students in its instructional program."
Several courts have imputed an effects standard to the statute. See, e.g., United States
v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Tex. 1981), rev'don other grounds, 680 F.2d 356 (5th Cir.
1982); Rios v. Reed, 480 F. Supp. 14 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Martin Luther King Junior Elemen-
tary School v. Ann Arbor, 473 F. Supp. 1371 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Cintron v. Brentwood
Union Free School Dist., 455 F. Supp. 57 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). Nevertheless, the limited scope
of the statute as compared to that of Title VI is apparent on its face. Coverage under
§ 1703(f) is restricted to litigants claiming "language barriers," while Title VI covers all
educational services denied on the basis of race, color, or national origin. Section 1703(1) is
further limited to the educational sector and to state action, while Title VI covers discrimi-
nation by a broad range of institutions and organizations, provided they are deemed recipi-
ents of federal funds.
17. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1981).
Section 1681 states: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. .. ."
18. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1981). The Act states: "No
otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in Section 706(6)
of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance ...."
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legislative history of Title VI, t9 which may serve as the interpretive ba-
sis of subsequent cases as to standards of proof required under these
statutes. 20 Finally, Title VI and its subsequent analogues reach not
only discrimination in public institutions and agencies, but also in pri-
vate organizations receiving federal financial assistance. These statutes
thereby serve as significant vehicles for preventing and eliminating dis-
crimination beyond the scope of state action, and, as such, expand the
protections mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause.
I. Judicial Interpretation: Prior Cases
A. The Disproportionate Impact Standard Under Title VII
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, and most notably Title VII of that
Act, was designed to assure the right to equal treatment a.2  However, as
litigants took their grievances to the courts, it became apparent to the
judiciary that equal treatment alone would not suffice to remedy the
effects of past discrimination, and so the principle of equal status or
equal results came to be applied with increasing frequency. 22 As a re-
sult, Title VII cases developed along two strands of discrimination the-
19. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (private right to sue
under Title IX). But see North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 102 S. Ct. 1912 (1982) (employ-
ment discrimination covered under Title IX even though not covered under Title VI). In
North Haven, the Court defined certain limits on the use of Title VI in interpreting subse-
quent statutes. The Court stated: "It is Congress' intention in 1972, not in 1964, that is of
significance in interpreting Title IX. The meaning and applicability of Title VI are useful
guides in construing Title IX ... only to the extent that the language and history of Title IX
do not suggest a contrary interpretation." Id at 1922.
20. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 648 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1128 (198 1), the plaintiff alleged a Title IX violation in the rejection of her application
for admission to the defendant medical school. The Seventh Circuit noted the Supreme
Court's directive in an earlier decision in the same case as to the private right to sue, i e., that
the courts should look to Title VI for guidance regarding the proper interpretation of Title
IX. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-96. Basing its discussion upon the Supreme Court decision
in Bakke as well as subsequent rulings in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), and
Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130 (1979), the Seventh Circuit concluded that a majority
of the Justices of the Supreme Court would hold that a violation of Title VI requires an
intentional discriminatory act, and therefore adopted that standard under Title IX.
21. 110 CONG. REc. 1519 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler). Accord id at 12,614 (re-
marks of Sen. Muskie) ("Every American citizen has the right to equal treatment-not fa-
vored treatment, not complete individual equality-just equal treatment.").
22. "Equal treatment" and "equal status" are concepts developed in Fiss, Groups and
the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 113-14 & n.8 (1976), and further
elaborated upon in Miller, Proof of Racially Discriminatory Purpose under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause: Washington v. Davis, Arlington Heights, Mt. Healthy and Williamsburgh, 12
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 725, 727-30 (1977). Equal treatment has also been referred to as
"equality of opportunity" and equal status as "equal achievement" or "equality of results."
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ory-disparate treatment and disparate impact-corresponding to the
equal treatment/equal status values. Within the framework of this di-
chotomy, the federal courts have applied prima facie case analysis, i e.,
a three-stage analytic approach to the evidentiary showings required of
plaintiff and defendant in Title VII litigation.
23
The most common type of discrimination involves disparate treat-
ment, whereby an employer subjects an individual to overtly different
treatment based solely upon race, color, sex, religion, or national ori-
gin.24 While this category of Title VII analysis is not directly applica-
ble to the Title VI issue at hand, the development of the case law is
worthy of discussion by way of contrast. In the leading disparate treat-
ment case, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,25 the Court established
the four general requirements of the plaintiff's prima facie case:
(1) membership in a protected class; (2) application and qualification
for the job; (3) rejection by the employer despite qualification; and
(4) the existence of a vacancy for the position and continued efforts by
the employer, after rejection of the plaintiff, to fill the vacancy with
another person with the complainant's qualifications.
After the plaintiff has established the prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the defendant employer to "articulate some legitimate non-
See also Comment, The Supreme Court'r Interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Lib-
erty, Equality, and the Limitation of Judicial Power, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REV. 295, 296-303.
23. Prima facie is a Latin term meaning "on its face." In the context of discrimination
law, the term denotes statistical or other evidence of objective facts that, if accepted, removes
the element of factual inequality from mere speculation and raises the conclusion of discrim-
ination to the level of inference. See Comment, Aplying the Title V11 Prima Facie Case to
Title VIILitigation, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 129 (1976). The prima facie case is proce-
durally useful to plaintiffs in avoiding a summary judgment and shifting the burden to the
defendant to produce evidence in rebuttal of the presumption of discrimination. See Mc-
CORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 336, 338 (2d ed. 1972).
24. A third theory based upon "pattern or practice" is actually a variant of the disparate
treatment theory. In order to establish the prima facie case, the plaintiff must prove that the
employer has systematically treated the group of which plaintiff is a member less fairly than
others on the basis of an impermissible consideration. For example, proof that the employer
has regularly hired only men to specific positions over the years despite equally qualified
female applicants may create the rebuttable presumption that individual women have been
subjected to unlawful discrimination. During congressional debates on Title VII, Senator
Humphrey defined pattern-or-practice discrimination as having occurred "if a company re-
peatedly and regularly engaged in acts prohibited by statute. . . . [S]ingle, insignificant,
isolated acts of discrimination by a single business would not justify a finding of a pattern or
practice.. . ." 110 CONG. REC. 14,270 (1964).
25. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The plaintiff Green was a mechanic and long-time civil
rights activist who had been laid off as part of a reduction in the defendant corporation's
workforce. To protest his discharge, Green participated in an illegal "stall-in." Several
weeks later, he responded to a company advertisement for qualified mechanics and was
denied employment based upon his participation in the illegal activities.
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discriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. ' 26 It should be
noted that no requirement of proof of intent is placed initially upon the
plaintiff. However, once the defendant's burden of proof is satisfied,
the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that de-
fendant's purportedly nondiscriminatory explanation is merely a pre-
text shielding a true discriminatory purpose. The plaintiff raises the
inference of discrimination by proving the four elements of the prima
facie case, the defendant rebuts the presumption with a nondiscrimina-
tory justification, and the plaintiff must then offer evidence leading to
an inference of intentional discrimination. So, while direct proof of
intent is not part of a plaintiff's prima facie case, the burden of indi-
rectly proving intentional discrimination is placed upon plaintiff in the
third evidentiary stage.
Four years after McDonnell Douglas, in International Brotherhood
of Teamsters v. United States, the Court refined the liability theory by
noting that in disparate treatment cases, "[p]roof of discriminatory mo-
tive is critical."'27 The intent element as required by the Court, how-
ever, was not that of direct proof of the employer's subjective
discriminatory intent, but merely an inference to be drawn from the
plaintiff's proof that defendant's justification for the treatment was not
legitimate. The following year, in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,
the Court reaffirmed the presumption that, in the absence of legitimate
explanations to the contrary, acts of disparate treatment "are more
likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors."2
The precise nature of the burden placed upon defendant to "artic-
ulate some nondiscriminatory reason" as enunciated by the Court in
McDonnell Douglas was given further clarification in Texas Depart-
ment of Community Affairs v. Burdine.29 In that case, the Court limited
the defendant's burden to merely producing evidence that legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons existed for the challenged employment ac-
tion. The defendant did not need to persuade the Court that the rejec-
tion was actually motivated by the proffered justifications, but was
merely required to set forth, through the introduction of admissible evi-
dence, the reasons for the plaintiffs rejection. 30 As a result of Burdine,
it is now clear that since the burden of proof in a Title VII disparate
treatment case rests on the plaintiff employee, the defendant employer
26. Id
27. 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
28. 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
29. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
30. Id at 254.
[Vol. 1:15
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will prevail unless the plaintiff conclusively establishes that discrimina-
tion was the basis for the employment decision1.
3
Returning to the equal treatment/equal status dichotomy, the
equal treatment principle is "process-oriented," emphasizing the "puri-
fication of the decision process. '32 Equal treatment is further based
upon the philosophical concept of liberty, as compared with the second
theory upon which the Court has decided a smaller group of Title VII
cases-that of disparate impact, which is based upon the concept of
equality.
Disparate impact theory looks toward equal status as the goal of
discrimination law. It is concerned with group and not individual
rights, is "result-oriented," and aims at achieving substantive as op-
posed to procedural equality through the elimination of the effects of
past societal discrimination. Disparate (disproportionate) impact the-
ory recognizes that policies neutral on their face may still deny persons
equal opportunity where adverse effects fall disproportionately on
members of a protected class.33 Disparate impact theory, with its oper-
ational framework of evidentiary burdens developed by the Court in
the past decade, may best serve as the proper analytic model for Title
VI cases.34
The Court's first definitive interpretation of Title VII came in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ,3 in which the Court rejected the equal
treatment approach of the lower courts and applied that of equal status.
31. Upon remand, the Fifth Circuit reversed its earlier decision and held that, based
upon the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII, the plaintiff had failed to prove em-
ployment discrimination. 647 F.2d 513 (1981).
32. Fiss, The Fate of an Idea Whose Time Has Yet to Come: Antidiscrimination Law in
the Second Decade After Brown v. Board of Educ., 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 742, 764 (1974).
33. Id See also Fiss, supra note 22; Comment, supra note 23, at 297.
34. In the typical case brought under Title VI, the policies and practices of the defend-
ant school board or state/municipal officials are neutral on their face and therefore evidence
a record clear of discriminatory intent, yet show disproportionately burdensome effects on
racial minorities. A common example in the educational setting is the segregation of stu-
dents by race, for purposes of providing remedial or special services, and therefore facially
based upon an educational justification. In the case of municipal services, the most common
cases have been those of hospital closings in minority neighborhoods based upon reduced
financial resources or decreasing clientele resulting in administrative inefficiency.
35. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The case was brought under § 703(a) and (h) of Title VII, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Section 703(a) declares it an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer "to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." Section 703(h) further states: "Notwithstanding any other
provision of this title, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer...
to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that
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Holding that "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent" was es-
sentially irrelevant inasmuch as "Congress directed the thrust of the
Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the moti-
vation,"36 the Court developed a two-part test of liability to be applied
in Title VII disparate impact cases. First, the plaintiff must establish a
prima facie case by proving that the challenged practice has had a dis-
proportionate impact on a minority group of which the plaintiff is a
member. Then, the burden shifts to the defendant employer to show
that "any given requirement has a manifest relationship to the employ-
ment in question.
37
In Griggs, the Court also enunciated the "business necessity" rule
whereby an employment practice, is prohibited if it operates to exclude
racial minorities and cannot be shown to be job-related.3" The Court
looked to the legislative history of Title VII and to the guidelines issued
by the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, which interpret
section 703(h) and permit only the use of job-related tests. Affording
deference to the administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforc-
ing agency, and finding the legislative history and the Commission's
construction in accord, the Court treated the "job-relatedness" guide-
lines as an expression of congressional intent.39
The Court looked further to the legislative history of the Act and
found the overall legislative intent in enacting Title VII to have been
the achievement of equality of employment opportunities and the re-
moval of "barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifi-
able group of white employees over other employees."'  This
objective-to remedy the effects of prior societal discrimination, with
an emphasis upon group as opposed to individual rights-fits the
Court's decision in Griggs neatly into the "equal status" paradigm, as
contrasted with a process-oriented approach.4
such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended, or used to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant employer's requirement-that all applicants for
employment or transfer either present evidence of completion of high school or pass a stan-
dardized general intelligence test-impacted disproportionately upon racial minorities, and
thereby constituted a Title VII violation. At trial, the employer failed to prove that either
standard was related sufficiently to successful job performance.
36. 401 U.S. at 432.
37. Id
38. Id. at 431.
39. Id at 434-36 & n.10.
40. Id at 430.
41. See Comment, supra note 22, at 331, in which the author draws a distinction be-
tween the interpretive approach taken by the Court in equal treatment as compared with
equal status cases. While the language and structure of the statute itself is foremost in the
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The Court further refined the two-part theory of Title VII liability
as enunciated in Griggs by adding a third step inAlbemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody.42 In the event that the defendant meets his burden of showing
"job-relatedness" or "business necessity," the plaintiff may prove by a
preponderance of the evidence the availability of alternative means
that would have served the employer's legitimate interest while avoid-
ing undesirable racial effects.4 3 Although the Court in Griggs merely
placed on the defendant the burden of "showing" job relatedness, in
Albemarle the Court expanded that burden to "proving."'  This termi-
nology was later used in the 1977 case of Dothard v. Rawlinson .41 Both
Albemarle and Dothard represent a more exacting standard imposed
by the Court on the defendant in disparate impact cases. The burden
of persuasion as to job-relatedness is thus heavier in impact cases than
it is in disparate treatment cases, in which the defendant must merely
come forward with some credible evidence of a nondiscriminatory jus-
tification for its action.' It therefore appears that in disparate impact
cases, once the plaintiff raises the inference of discrimination by proof
of disproportionate impact, the burden of proof, and not merely the
burden of production, shifts to the defendant.
It has also been suggested that the element of intent is not com-
pletely irrelevant to disproportionate impact actions. By proving the
existence of an alternative and less discriminatory policy, the plaintiff
raises the inference that the defendant's reliance on the means used was
merely a pretext for discrimination, similar to the intent-oriented third
element of proof in disparate treatment cases.47 This analogy demands
clarification. It should be noted that in a disparate treatment case, the
plaintiff must prove intent; that is, the plaintiff must show that the rea-
sons proffered by the defendant are a mere pretext for intent to discrim-
inate. In a disparate impact case, on the other hand, plaintiff will
analysis of equal treatment cases, with a decided deference to the intentions of the original
drafters, such postenactment developments as (a) administrative interpretations and reenact-
ment after contemporaneous interpretation, (b) legislative silence implying approval of con-
temporaneous interpretations, and (c) interpretation by reference to related statutes, are the
distinctive features of the interpretive approach utilized in disparate impact cases.
42. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
43. Id at 425.
44. Id
45. 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
46. In Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 n.5 (1981), the
Court noted the distinction made in prior cases as to burdens of proof in disparate treatment
as opposed to disparate impact cases, limiting by implication its ruling in that case to the
category of disparate treatment.
47. See Friedman, The Burger Court and The Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimi-
nation Litigation .4 Critique, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3 (1979).
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prevail merely by proving the existence of alternative means absent any
direct or indirect proof of intent. The possibility that such proof may
raise the inference of discriminatory intent is merely of academic inter-
est and totally irrelevant to the burdens of proof and the nature of the
evidence required. As the next section points out, the factors that the
Court has declared to bear upon the issue of intent place a considerably
more onerous burden upon plaintiff than does a requirement of mere
proof of the existence of alternative and less discriminatory means
available to the defendant.
B. The Intent Standard Under the Fourteenth Amendment
Over the course of the 1960's and 1970's, as the Supreme Court
incrementally developed rules of law as to the standard of review to be
applied in Title VII cases, the Court engaged in a rather confused and
conflicting interpretation of cases -brought under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 48 Before examining the Court's
interpretation of discriminatory intent and disproportionate impact,
however, it is necessary to examine the scope and overall structure of
equal protection doctrine that has served to protect "discrete and insu-
lar minorities. 49
The Equal Protection Clause was born out of a history of blatantly
race-conscious treatment of blacks. It was initially directed at eradicat-
ing the vestiges of slavery. During the early years of judicial interpre-
tation, a distinction was drawn between "political" equality, which was
to be protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, and "civil" or social
equality, which was merely a matter of taste or mores.50 Between its
adoption in 1868 and the Court's decision in Brown v. Board ofEduca-
lion5 in 1954, the Equal Protection Clause played a minimal role in
constitutional adjudication.52
48. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See supra note 9.
49. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
50. See Gates, The Supreme Court and The Debate Over Discriminatory Purpose and
Disproportionate Impact, 26 Loy. L. REv. 567 (1980). The Court in Strauder v. West Vir-
ginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), invalidated a West Virginia law excluding blacks from juries but
failed to give similar protection to social equality in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883), in which it invalidated a federal statute forbidding discriminatory practices in places
of "public accomodation." The now famous "separate but equal" doctrine enunciated in
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), is a clear example of the Court's reluctance to
adjudicate what it believed to be a matter of social custom outside the purview of the law.
51. 347 U.S. 483,(1954).
52. Justice Holmes called it "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments." Buck v.
Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). Cf. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws,
37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 380 (1949) ("Where the clause is held to govern, its application is
halting, indecisive and unpredictable.").
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Brown and its early progeny dismissed the political/social equality
distinction drawn in the earlier cases, as the Court was presented with
overt governmental acts of racial discrimination, discriminatory on
their face, which it consistently invalidated without judicial explora-
tions into purpose or motive. 3 Beginning in the 1960's, however, two
significant developments occurred in equal protection analysis that
caused the Fourteenth Amendment to become one of the most fertile
sources of constitutional litigation. First, the Court began to address
the problem of covert discrimination, that is, governmental practices
that are facially neutral but that have a discriminatory effect on pro-
tected groups.14 The practices in question were no longer so blatantly
discriminatory as to provide prima facie evidence of discrimination.
The issue became whether mere disproportionate impact on a protected
group would be a sufficient standard for determining discriminatory
classifications. If not, the Court would be forced to embark on the un-
charted and traditionally avoided waters of judicial examination of
governmental purpose.55
A second development in equal protection analysis in recent years
has been a judicial broadening of the scope of protection beyond racial
classifications, to include discrimination based upon alienage,56 legiti-
53. In the several years immediately following Brown, the Court invalidated laws that
expressly provided for segregated parks in New Orleans City Parks Improvement Ass'n v.
Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses); Mayor & City
Council v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches). The Court decided many of these early
post-Brown segregation cases by per curiam orders without any inquiry into what were obvi-
ously discriminatory motives. See Ely, Legislative andAdministrative Motivation in Constitu-
tional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1293-94 n.265 (1970); Schwemm, From Washington to
Arlington Heights and Beyond- Discriminatory Purpose in Equal Protection Litigation, 1977
U. ILL. L.F. 961, 974.
54. See Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword In Defense of the Antidis-
crimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1976). As Professor Brest has noted: "The first
order of business in the era following Brown was to halt the ongoing, pervasive, and often
overt practices of discriminatory exclusion of blacks from schools, voting booths, jobs, res-
taurants, housing, and the like. . .. By the late 1960's, the civil rights enforcement effort
had eliminated the most flagrant practices. Covert discrimination continued to flourish,
however, and the very successes of the '60's dispelled any notions that blacks would quickly
become integrated into the economic and social life of the nation." Id
55. One commentator has noted that the choice between purpose and effect has been
further complicated by the Court's failure to decide whether equality of treatment or equal-
ity of status should be the dominant equal protection value. A discriminatory purpose test is
related to equal treatment and individual equality, for it proscribes explicit considerations of
race, whereas a disproportionate impact test is related to equal group status. See Miller,
supra note 22.
56. See, e.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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macy,57 and sex.5" The civil rights movement of the 1960's and subse-
quent judicial and legislative intervention on behalf of racial minorities
raised the social consciousness of the nation and prompted additional
groups to lobby for protective legislation and to press their claims
before the courts.
In this atmosphere of increasing judicial concern with covert dis-
criminatory acts and a broadening of protected classes, the Supreme
Court continued into its modern era of equal protection analysis begun
with its 1944 decision in Korematsu v. United States. 9 In the past two
decades, the Court has developed a "two-tier" doctrinal structure for
reviewing classifications under the Equal Protection Clause and, more
recently, a middle tier for newly included protected groups.60 Under
current doctrine, state action is subject to strict scrutiny if it impinges
on a "fundamental right ' 61 or discriminates against a "suspect class."62
The state must then demonstrate that its action was necessary to ad-
vance a compelling state interest and that no less drastic means of
achieving that interest were available to the decisionmaker.63 If the
state's action adversely affects neither a fundamental right nor a sus-
pect class, "minimal scrutiny" is applied and the state merely must
demonstrate that the classification is reasonably related to any legiti-
mate governmental interest. Traditionally, the Court has afforded
decision-makers wide discretion as to the interest promoted under this
lesser standard of review.
57. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Weber v. Aetna Casualty &,Sur.
Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
58. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S.
199 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636
(1975).
59. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). As one commentator has noted, "the doctrine was later
molded into an interventionist sword with which the Warren Court carved out its high ide-
als." Comment, The Veterans' Preference Statutes: Do They Really' Discriminate Against
Women?, 18 DUQ. L. RaV. 653, 661 (1980). See also Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-
Foreword- Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L.
REv. 91 (1966) ("Once loosed, the idea of Equality is not easily cabined.").
60. Middle-tier scrutiny originated in the Court's approach to gender-based classifica-
tions. See supra note 58. It has also been used in recent years with regard to legitimacy.
See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
61. The Court has granted fundamental status to criminal defendants' rights. See, e.g.,
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (inter-
state travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting rights); Doug-
las v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
62. The word "suspect" is derived from Justice Black's majority opinion in Korematsu,
323 U.S. at 216.
63. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
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The point of intersection between discriminatory purpose and dis-
proportionate impact on the one hand, and suspect classifications on
the other, is significant to the present discussion. The former tests are
used by the courts in establishing whether a given law or public policy,
overtly premised on a rational discernment between groups or individ-
uals, is covertly premised on a suspect criterion despite its apparent
neutrality. It is this suspect criterion that then triggers a heightened
standard of review or "strict scrutiny." At this point, the standard of
proof comes into play. Proof of discriminatory purpose carries a high
probability that a racial classification will be held discriminatory,
whereas disproportionate racial impact has traditionally played a mi-
nor role as proof of a prejudicial racial classification.
Prior to its 1976 decision in Washington v. Davis,' the Court vacil-
lated between purpose and effect as the standard of proof to be applied
in equal protection cases challenging facially neutral acts yielding dis-
criminatory results. An examination of those early cases and of Davis
and its progeny is essential to an understanding of the intent/impact
debate.
L Cases Prior to Washington v. Davis
The first major challenge of a facially neutral state law that clearly
had been designed to maintain segregation came in Gomillion v.
Lightfoot. 65 In that case, the Court invalidated an Alabama law that
had changed the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee "from a square to
an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure,"6 6 excluding almost al of the
city's four hundred black voters but none of its whites. Justice Frank-
furter, speaking for the majority, noted that the "inevitable effect" of
the law would be to deny the black voters of Tuskegee the right to vote
in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.67 Nowhere did the Court
mention discriminatory purpose per se. However, several commenta-
tors have noted that the majority's conclusion in that regard is clear.68
Justice Frankfurter declared that "the legislation is solely concerned
with segregating white and colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out
of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote."6 9
64. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
65. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
66. Id at 340.
67. Id at 342.
68. Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of ConstitutionalAd-
judication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 108 (1977); Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of
Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 540, 547 (1977).
69. 364 U.S. at 341.
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Seven years later, in the context of desegregation, the Court invali-
dated Prince Edward County's decision to close its public schools and
pay tuition grants to students attending private schools. In Griffin v.
County School Board,7 ° the Court ordered that the public schools be
reopened because they had been closed "for one reason, and one rea-
son only: to insure. . . that white and colored children in Prince Ed-
ward County would not, under any circumstances, go to the same
school."'" Because the plan "[was] created to accomplish. . . the per-
petuation of racial segregation," Justice Black, in his maiority opinion,
concluded that it "works to deny colored students equal protection of
the laws."72 In contrast to Gomillion, the Court in GrXin was dealing
not with a facially neutral law, but rather with one that was discrimina-
tory on its face, given a prior history of state mandated segregation.
The language of both cases further alludes to a mix of purpose and
effect as the focus of judicial analysis.
In Reitman v. Mulkey,73 the Court invalidated a California state
constitutional amendment establishing the right of private persons to
discriminate on racial grounds in real estate transactions. The Court
viewed the amendment as an official authorization of racial discrimina-
tion that significantly involved the state in the discriminatory acts of
private parties.74 Writing for a five-member majority, Justice White
examined the constitutionality of the amendment in terms of "its 'im-
mediate objective,' its 'ultimate effect' and its 'historical context and
conditions existing prior to its enactment.' "75 The provision had been
adopted shortly after state enactment of fair housing laws. The major-
ity concluded that the "ultimate impact" and the only conceivable pur-
pose of the amendment was to nullify these laws and to thereby
authorize private racial discrimination in housing.7 6 Again, the Court
based its determination on a record of recent historical events and ap-
parently applied a combined intent/impact standard.
Two years after Reitman, in Hunter v. Erickson,77 the Court did
not expressly refer to either purpose or effect, but rather examined his-
torical events leading up to an amendment to the Akron city charter
70. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
71. Id at 231.
72. Id at 232.
73. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
74. Id at 376-78, 380-81.
75. Id at 373 (quoting Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 259, 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr.
881 (1966)).
76. 387 U.S. at 374-76, 381.
77. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
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that required the approval of fair housing ordinances by referendum.
The Court invalidated the amendment, concluding that while the law
was facially neutral as to race, "the reality is that the law's impact falls
on the minority."78
At this point, the development of the case law as to intent versus
impact standards in equal protection adjudication reaches the juncture
between the Warren and Burger Courts. While the Warren Court had
moved in the direction of establishing some loosely defined rules on
intent plus impact, the Court had never expressly stated that proof of
either alone would suffice, as the impact in such cases was readily dis-
cernible and intent could easily be inferred from the Court's examina-
tion of historical context.. The cases brought before the Burger Court,
however, represented more complex sets of facts, with records less
readily indicative of prior discrimination. While the Warren Court had
consistently granted relief to plaintiffs, the Burger Court decisions ap-
pear to have fashioned the standard according to the facts of the case
affording plaintiffs the least probability of prevailing. The Court
opened the 1970's applying a "purpose or effects" standard,79 which
ultimately evolved into the Davis standard of intent. The early 1970's
proved to be a judicial turning point marked by the greatest inconsis-
tency in a series of closely decided cases. In those cases in which the
Court refused to consider official purpose, either the defendants pre-
vailed as in Palmer v. Thompson 10 or the plaintiffs prevailed by a mere
five-member majority as in Wright v. Council of Emporia."
In Dandridge v. Williams, the Court upheld a Maryland welfare
system that placed a dollar limit on AFDC grants regardless of family
size or actual need. Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart noted the
absence of any "contention that the Maryland regulation is infected
with a racially discriminatory purpose or effect such as to make it in-
herently suspect."82 Here, the Court lowered the standard of proof
from the "purpose plus effect" Qf the earlier cases and implied for the
first time that proof of either purpose or effect would suffice. Whereas
in prior cases, recent historical events could provide facts from which to
infer discriminatory purpose and thereby fortify the plaintiff s case, in
Dandridge, the Court failed to engage in any historical examination
but merely reviewed the instant facts on their face.
78. Id at 391.
79. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
80. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
81. 407 U.S. 451 (19.72).
82. 397 U.S. at 485 n.17.
31
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The following year, Justice Black writing for a 5-4 majority in
Palmer, maintained that in no prior case had the Court "held that a
legislative act may violate equal protection solely because of the moti-
vations of the men who voted for it." 3 The Court upheld the decision
of the Jackson, Mississippi city council to close rather than desegregate
its public swimming pools. Unlike earlier decisions, in which the Court
had afforded considerable weight to recent historical events, the deci-
sion in Palmer appeared to ignore the fact that the formerly segregated
pools had been closed following a court order to desegregate public
facilities.
In Palmer, the Court for the first time discussed the problem of
"ascertainability" in cases of multiple motivations, as well as the "futil-
ity" in judicial attempts to invalidate laws based upon improper mo-
tives. As to the first problem, the Court maintained that "[i]t is difficult
or impossible for any court to determine the 'sole' or 'dominant' moti-
vation behind the choices of a group of legislators." 4 As to "futility,"
the Court maintained that a law invalidated on the grounds of imper-
missible motives could presumably become valid as soon as the deci-
sionmaking body repassed it for different and permissible reasons.8 "
The Court further held that, while such cases as Grffin and Gomillion
may suggest that motive or purpose is relevant in equal protection
analysis, the focus of those cases was on the actual effect of the enact-
ments and not on the motivation behind them. The concurring opin-
ions of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun foreshadowed two
points that would arise again in subsequent cases.86 The Chief Justice
suggested that, were the service that had been terminated deemed to be
essential as compared to merely desirable, then perhaps judicial analy-
sis might differ. Justice Blackmun further elaborated on this point and
suggested that a higher degree of judicial scrutiny might be appropriate
were essential services such as education involved. Both concurring
opinions deferred to local officials in the case of merely desirable serv-
ices and recognized the "growing burdens" and "shrinking revenues"
of municipal and state governments, suggesting the potential financial
83. 403 U.S. at 224.
84. Id at 225.
85. Id For a discussion of problems inherent in judicial review of motivation, including
ascertainability, futility, disutility (law passed for an illicit reason may in effect be a good
law), and impropriety (undesirable intrusion into political process), see Brest, Palmer v.
Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup.
CT. REV. 95, 116; Ely, supra note 53, at 1212.
86. 403 U.S. at 227-28 (Burger, C.J., concurring); See also id at 229 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); Schwemm, supra note 53, at 982.
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impact on the defendant might be of proper judicial consideration in
equal protection analysis.8 7
A school desegregation issue did, in fact, present itself to the Court
the following year in Wright v. Council of Emporia.8 This case in-
volved the city's withdrawal from a county school system following a
court order to desegregate the county schools. Writing for a five to four
majority, Justice Stewart relied upon the "effects" standard of Palmer
and reversed the decision of the Fourth Circuit, which had applied a
"dominant purpose" test.89 The Court maintained that such a test
"finds no precedent in our decisions" although "a demonstrated racial
purpose may be taken into consideration in determining the weight to
be given" a nonracial justification proffered by a school board.9" The
Court further stated that "[t]he existence of a permissible purpose can-
not sustain an action that has an impermissible effect."'" Finally, the
Court applied a "totality of the circumstances" test in weighing all the
factors-historical, sociological, educational-to determine their effect
upon the desegregation process. It is noteworthy that joining in the
dissent written by Chief Justice Burger were Justices Blackmun, Pow-
ell, and Rehnquist, the latter two having replaced Justices Harlan and
Black after the Court's decision in Palmer supporting the "effects" stan-
dard. This change in Court membership explains in part the inconsis-
tency found in the decisions of the early 1970's and further marks a
turning point in the Court's analysis of equal protection claims as to
standards of proof.92
During the following term, the Court was faced with its first school
desegregation case outside the South and with the issue of racial imbal-
ance in a school system free from a history of officially mandated segre-
gation. The plaintiffs in Keyes v. School District No. 193 alleged that
the Denver school board's gerrymandering of attendance zones, selec-
tion of school sites, and adoption of a neighborhood school policy had
resulted in a segregated system. The Court held that proof of deliber-
ately segregative acts on the part of the school board in a substantial
87. See 403 U.S. at 228 (Burger, C.J.); id. at 229 (Blackmun, J.).
88. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
89. Wright v. Council of Emporia, 442 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1971), rev'g Wright v. County
School Bd., 309 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Va. 1970).
90. 407 U.S. at 461.
91. Id at 462.
92. In a strongly worded dissent echoing their concurring opinions in Palmer, Chief
Justice Burger joined by Justice Blackmun supported the relevance of discriminatory pur-
pose in school desegregation cases and further called for judicial restraint and deference to
local control. I1d at 477-78, 482-83 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
93. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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portion of the system raised the rebuttable presumption of intentional
segregation in the entire system. The Court further drew the distinc-
tion between dejure and defacto segregation based upon proof of in-
tent, holding that "in the special context of school desegregation cases"
and in the absence of a history of officially mandated segregation, a
necessary element of an equal protection claim was 'Purpose or intent
to segregate. 94
It was not until three years later that the Court's position in Keyes
was tested outside the realm of school desegregation and within the
context of employment testing.95 Although the cases prior to Washing-
ton v. Davis reflect a certain vacillation, inconsistency, and a fact-based
approach, some common considerations in determining equal protec-
tion violations run through the decisions. Justice White wrote in Davis
that prior cases had not "embraced the proposition that a law or other
official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discrimina-
tory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially dispro-
portionate impact."96 In those cases in which an effects standard had
been applied (Gomillion, Dandridge, Wright), the Court had either ex-
pressly or impliedly looked to the historical context and recent events
in order to draw an inference of intent.
97
Those cases decided on an intent standard (Griffin, Keyes) both
concerned school desegregation issues. The first was an early case in
which motive was expressly relied upon and could readily have been
94. Id. at 208. While Justice Powell had dissented from the majority opinion in Wright,
which had applied an effects standard, his concurring opinion in Keyes maintains that an
effects test would better insure the elimination of even subtle racial discrimination in the
decisions of school board officials. Id at 227 (Powell, J., concurring). He further notes that
a test based on purpose would not only render equal protection claims difficult to prove, but
would also lead to "fortuitous, unpredictable and even capricious" results. Id. at 233. This
position appears to represent a change from that taken in the Wright dissent, and can only
be explained by the difference in the facts that the two cases presented before the Court.
Wright dealt with a city in Virginia in which schools had been segregated by law immedi-
ately prior to a court order to desegregate. While the majority focused upon effect, discrimi-
natory intent could easily have been inferred from the historical context of the case. Keyes
presented the Court with a novel and far more difficult problem. Unless the Court were to
read the minds of the school board members to determine subjective intent or motive, infer-
ences as to objective intent would be difficult to draw from the decisions made by officials in
formulating traditionally benign organizational policies, absent any history of legally man-
dated segregation. Justice Powell's shift in position between Wright and Keyes reflects a
more pervasive "result-oriented" approach taken by the Court in the cases preceding Davis.
See, e.g., Note, Reading the Mind of the School Board- Segregative Intent and the De
Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317 (1976).
95. See infra text accompanying notes 98-105.
96. 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
97. Palmer marked an exception in which the Court upheld official action based solely
on the absence of a discriminatory effect. See supra text accompanying notes 83-87.
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inferred from the blatantly discriminatory effects of official action. The
second presented the Court with more subtle facts from which to draw
inferences of discriminatory intent. Whether the Court was attempting
to define the standard based upon the issues presented, with a finding
of intent to be applied required only in education discrimination cases,
is difficult to determine, particularly in view of the effects test applied
in Wright. Perhaps the Court's pre-Davis inconsistency resulted from a
variety of coalescing factors, including a transition from the Warren to
the Burger Courts, a change in membership adding more judicially re-
strained Justices, a broadening of the issues brought before the Court,
and a simultaneously developing body of case law recognizing an ef-
fects standard to be applied in Title VII litigation. It was in Davis that
the Court was forced to take a position and distinguish between stan-
dards of proof required in cases brought under constitutional as op-
posed to statutory claims.
2 Davis and Its Progeny
Washington v. Davis9" represents the Court's first review of a dis-
proportionate impact case absent any claim of intentional discrimina-
tion. Plaintiffs alleged that the written verbal ability test required for
employment by the District of Columbia Police Department bore no
relationship to job performance and excluded a disproportionately high
number of black applicants, in violation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.
The Court held that the court of appeals had erred in applying the
Griggs effects standard to a constitutional case. 99 The Supreme Court
not only laid down the intent standard to be applied in equal protection
analysis, but further attempted to present at least some vague guide-
lines as to shifting burdens of proof and means for determining dis-
criminatory intent. According to Davis, once the plaintiff establishes
the prima facie case by proof of a discriminatory purpose, the burden
shifts to the defendant to "'rebut the presumption of unconstitutional
action by showing that permissible racially neutral selection criteria
and procedures have produced the monochromatic result.'-100 Intent
may be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts-echoing the
"historical context" considerations of earlier cases-or from a blatantly
discriminatory impact. The Court, however, was quick to warn that
disproportionate impact "is not the sole touchstone of an invidious ra-
98. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
99. Id at 238, rev'g 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
100. 426 U.S. at 241 (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
cial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution."'
l01
The Court apparently recognized the necessity of distinguishing
some of its prior impact decisions-particularly that of Palmer-from
the present case. In a brief explanatory footnote, the Court stated that
"[t]o the extent that Palmer suggests a generally applicable proposition
that legislative purpose is irrelevant in constitutional adjudication, our
prior cases. . . are to the contrary.""0 2 The Court stated its rationale
for an intent standard in constitutional litigation as founded on judicial
restraint. A disproportionate impact standard could render invalid a
"whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing
statutes."' 0 Finally, the Court deferred to legislative action for any
possible extension of the impact rule beyond the point to which it was
already applicable by statute. While the point is never expressly stated,
the majority opinion by Justice White assumes that the discriminatory
purpose requirement calls for an objective assessment of the "totality of
the circumstances," including the disproportionate impact of the offi-
cial action, as opposed to the subjective analysis of official motivation.
The opinion's consistent use of the word "purpose" stands in sharp
contrast to the Court's earlier opinions, which often used "purpose,"
"intent," and "motive" as though the terms were synonymous.1 4
Viewed in this perspective, the Davis opinion does not represent a radi-
cal departure from judicial concerns expressed and standards enunci-
ated in earlier cases, but rather the culmination of an evolutionary line
of development with minor digressions along the way. 105
Further clarification of the Davis holding came the following term
in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp. 106 The case was brought by a nonprofit developer and minority
individuals, challenging the village's denial of the developer's applica-
tion for rezoning a tract of land from a single to a multiple-family clas-
101. 426 U.S. at 242.
102. Id at244n.11.
103. Id at 248.
104. See Schwemm, supra note 53 at 972, 1004.
105. In fact, in his concurring opinion in Davis, Justice Stevens remarked that "[tihe
requirement of purposeful discrimination is a common thread running through the [prior]
cases .... " 426 U.S. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens' understanding of
intent rests upon "objective evidence of what actually happened rather than evidence
describing the subjective state of mind of the actor." Id Echoing the Court's "purpose or
effect" standard in Dandridge, he viewed the line between purpose and impact as "not nearly
as bright, and perhaps not quite as critical" as one might assume. Id at 254. He conceded
that disproportionate impact alone is insufficient proof of an equal protection violation.
However, the disproportion may be as dramatic as that in Gomillion, such that either an
intent or an effect standard would yield the same result. Id
106. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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sification. Plaintiffs alleged the denial was racially discriminatory and
violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, maintained that "Davis
does not require a plaintiff to prove that the challenged action rested
solely on racially discriminatory purposes. . . or even that a particular
purpose was the 'dominant' or 'primary' one."' 10 7 Unlike the Davis
opinion, which spoke exclusively in terms of "purpose," the opinion in
Arlington Heights used the term "motivating factor." Yet this term was
obviously not used in the sense of subjective motivation, requiring judi-
cial examination of the minds of government officials, but rather in
terms of objective evidence. For example, the Court presented five fac-
tors that might be considered in determining whether "invidious dis-
criminatory purpose was a motivating factor." Included among these
are: (1) the impact of the official action, that is, whether it bears more
heavily upon one race; (2) a clear pattern of governmental discrimina-
tion unexplainable on grounds other than race; (3) the historical back-
ground of the decision, particularly the specific sequence of events
leading up to the challenged decision; (4) departures from the normal
procedural sequence; and (5) legislative or administrative history, par-
ticularly contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking
body.10  While the Court in Davis clearly stated that disproportionate
impact alone is not sufficient as proof of discriminatory purpose, the
Court in Arlington Heights implied that, given a pattern of discrimina-
tion as stark as that in Gomillion, impact alone might be
determinative. 0 9
In summary, Justice Powell's articulation of the applicable legal
standard in Arlington Heights proved to be a mixed bag of clarification
in the form of nonexhaustive guideposts and continued judicial vacilla-
tion as to the role of impact alone. It appears that the Court was apply-
ing an objective test of purpose, calling for an examination of overt
manifestations from which an inference of discrimintory purpose could
reasonably be inferred, rather than an examination of motivation in the
sense of racial or discriminatory "animus" on the part of officials.
What the Court failed to clarify is the weight to be afforded any of the
five evidentiary elements suggested as proper subjects of judicial in-
quiry. Nor did the Court expressly state that evidence of one of the
107. Id at 265.
108. Id at 265-68.
109. In discussing "discriminatory pattern" as one type of circumstantial or direct evi-
dence bearing upon proof of discriminatory purpose, Justice Powell stated that "[a]bsent a
pattern as stark as that in Gomillion ... . impact alone is not determinative, and the Court
must look to other evidence." Id at 266 (footnotes omitted).
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five, including impact, could be so blatant as to become determinative
of purpose.' 10 In fact, the Court treated the court of appeals' finding
that the village's decision carried a discriminatory "ultimate effect" as
"without independent constitutional significance.""' Perhaps the
greatest utility of Arlington Heights, then, was not its expansion on the
Davis doctrine of purpose but, as one commentat6r has noted, its affir-
mation that the discriminatory purpose requirement of Davis applied
to all types of racial discrimination claims under the Equal Protection
Clause." 12
Several months following its decision in Arlington Heights, the
Court was called upon to test the Davis standard as applied to jury
selection cases. Castaneda v. Panida 13 was initially brought into the
federal district court as a habeas corpus proceeding by a Mexican-
American convicted of a crime in the Texas District Court. Respon-
dent alleged that the gross underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans
on the county grand juries constituted a denial of due process and
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The relevant evi-
dence fell into three categories: (1) statistical evidence as to the dispro-
portionately low representation of M'exican-Americans on grand jury
list-; (2) the Texas grand jury selection system; and (3) the political
dominance and control of the Mexican-American majority in the
county.
Justice Blackmun, joined in the majority opinion by Justices Bren-
nan, White, Marshall, and Stevens, found that the respondent had es-
tablished a prima facie case of discrimination in grand jury selection
and that the state had failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut the
110. Note, however, that Justice Powell's reference to the state pattern of discrimination
evidenced in Gomillion certainly leads to such an inference.
111. 429 U.S. at 271.
112. Schwemm, supra note 53, at 1019. Schwemm justifiably criticizes the majority's
short perspective on "historical background"-4e., the fact that the Court limits its examina-
tion to the sequence of events set in motion by the plaintiff developer's petition for rezon-
ing-as compared with the broader approach taken in Davis, in which the Court considered
not only the police department's use of the literacy test but also the overall results of the
entire recruitment program. Id at 1029. However, he interprets the Court's use of "moti-
vating factor" literally and believes the focus to have been placed on the actual state of mind
of the officials.
An alternative interpretation is worthy of consideration. While the Court defined the
ultimate issue in equal protection cases as whether race was "a motivating factor," it also
permitted inferences to be drawn from the overt actions of officials. As an evidentiary mat-
ter, the Court did not place upon plaintiffs the burden of presenting direct or circumstantial
evidence of racial "animus" per se. On the other hand, a legal standard of discriminatory
"motive," in the purest sense, as opposed to mere "purpose," would have required such
evidence.
113. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
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presumption of intentional discrimination. The statistical under-
representation was deemed sufficient to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, and the evidence of a highly subjective system of select-
ing grand jurors in Texas was merely used as supporting evidence to
buttress that conclusion. 14 The Court cited Arlington Heights and its
consideration of "a clear pattern" of discrimination emerging "from
the effect of the state action"115 as well as the application of the princi-
ple to jury selection cases as discussed in Davis.
116
Justice Powell, joined in a dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Bur-
ger and Justice Rehnquist, took exception to the majority's sole reliance
upon statistical disparities. Citing Davis as standing for the proposition
that "[d]isproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but is not the sole
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination,"" 7 and also citing the
five evidentiary elements outlined in Arlington Heights,118 the dissent
concluded that statistical evidence showing underrepresentation alone
is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, but
should be considered in light of "such [other] circumstantial and direct
evidence of intent as may be available.""' 9
As Arlington Heights had left open the question of whether impact
could be so gross as to raise the inference of purposeful discrimination,
so Castaneda left open the question as to the role of statistics in proving
such a grossly disproportionate impact. The five to four majority in
Castaneda apparently believed statistical evidence would suffice.
While Davis seemed at first blush finally to establish a legal standard of
intent or purpose, Arlington Heights and Castaneda created confusion
as to the focus of judicial examination-objective officials acts from
which intent may be inferred or direct proof of discriminatory mo-
tive-as well as to the weight to be afforded various types of evidence,
including statistics.
Two years after Castaneda, in Personnel Administrator v. Fee-
114. Id at 494.
115. Id at 493.
116. As the Court had stated in Davis: "It is also clear from the cases dealing with racial
discrimination in the selection ofjuries that the systematic exclusion of Negroes is itself such
an 'unequal application of the law... as to show intentional discrimination.. . .' With a
prima facie case made out, 'the burden of proof shifts to the State to rebut the presumption
of unconstitutional action by showing that permissible racially neutral selection criteria and
procedures have produced the monochromatic result."' 426 U.S. at 241 (quoting Alexander
v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. at 632).
117. 426 U.S. at 242.
118. See supra text accompanying note 108.
119. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 514 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Arlington Heights, 429
U.S. at 266).
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ney, 2 ° the Court defined "discriminatory purpose" so narrowly that
the evidentiary burden on the plaintiff could prove impossible to meet,
absent, perhaps, an express declaration of discriminatory intent on the
part of the official decisionmakers. In Feeney, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a state statute granting veterans a preference over
nonveterans in the competition for civil service employment. The ac-
tion was brought by a female nonveteran who had ranked below male
veterans on eligibility lists for civil service positions, despite her higher
scores on civil service examinations. She had never been certified or
considered for any of the positions sought. The issue before the Court
was whether such veterans' preference statutes create an impermissible
gender classification in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart maintained that
"[d]iscriminatory purpose" implied a conscious choice by the legisla-
ture of a particular course of action selected "because of' not "in spite
of' its adverse impact on a particular group. 2 ' In arriving at its deci-
sion, the Court considered a variety of both subjective and objective
evidence. The subjective evidence included the stated goals of the vet-
erans' preference and the actual wording of the statute. The Court con-
cluded that the statute promoted the legitimate goal of aiding veterans.
The objective evidence included impact-related statistics, the statute's
legislative history, and the historical context of the veterans' employ-
ment preference. While the Court found that the statute severely re-
duced the public employment opportunities of women, it subordinated
the objective evidence of disproportionate impact to the subjective evi-
dence of legislative purpose. 122
In Davis, the Court had stated that "an invidious discriminatory
purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant
facts." 3 However, the "because of' not "in spite of' rule enunciated
120. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
121. Id at 279.
122. One commentator has observed that this weighing process between the imposed
classification and the governmental objective, with judicial determination of the legitimacy
or "compelling" nature of that objective, has traditionally been placed at a later point within
the traditional framework of equal protection analysis. "It is only after the classification is
identified as being based upon a discriminatory criterion and therefore "suspect" (through
proof of intent), that strict scrutiny is triggered and the court balances the classification
against the governmental interest promoted. If the intent test is not met, then strict scrutiny
is not triggered and a mere "rational basis" suffices, based on any legitimate governmental
purpose. It appears that in Feeney the Court collapsed the various steps in equal protection
analysis, or perhaps confused the "classification segment" of the test with the "balancing
segment." Comment, supra note 59, at 666.
123. 426 U.S. at 242.
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by the Court in Feeney indicates that the relevant facts must add up to
an inference of discriminatory "animus" or desire to harm on the part
of the decisionmaker. This definition finds little support in prior case
law. Furthermore, it is not clear how the Feeney rule affects the "single
motivation" issue.124 The Court repeatedly recognized that Davis does
not require proof of discriminatory purpose as the sole or dominant
motivating factor. The majority in Feeney permitted a legitimate legis-
lative purpose to negate any inference of a discriminatory purpose. As
Justice Marshall noted in his dissent in Feeney, this type of analysis is
problematic when applied to the decisions of a multimember legislative
body where the subjective intent of the individual legislators might dif-
fer dramatically from the expressed legislative intent of the statute. Ac-
cording to the dissent, discriminatory intent must be determined by
weighing the "degree, inevitability, and foreseeability of any dispropor-
tionate impact as well as the alternatives reasonably available."125
During the same term in which Feeney was decided, the Court, in
Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, clearly stated that proof of
disparate impact and foreseeable consequences is not a sufficient show-
ing of discriminatory intent to satisfy Davis.'26 In Columbus and its
companion case, Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman,I27 the Court
upheld the imposition of systemwide school desegregation plans based
upon proof of discriminatory intent on the part of the two respective
school districts. 28 The Court based its finding of intent upon an exam-
ination of all the relevant factors surrounding the operation of the
school systems-including the history of past segregative conduct in the
form of operating a dual system at the time of the Brown decision in
1954-and evidence that the discriminatory impact of such practices
and policies was actually aggravated by subsequent official action or
124. See, e.g., Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Disproportionate Impact: An Assessment
After Feeney, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1376, 1397 n.133 (1979). See also Brest, supra note 54, at
7 ("racial value judgments appear in forms besides 'racial antagonism'-for example in pa-
ternalistic assumptions of racial inferiority"), 14 ("Race-dependent decisions need not be
race-conscious, but may reflect unconscious racially selective indifference.").
125. 442 U.S. at 283 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See Note, Constitutional Law-A Chal-
lenge to Veterans'Preferences-Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 28 U.
KAN. L. REv. 520 (1980); Note, Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 11
SETON HALL L. REv. 86 (1980); Note, Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,
48 U. C. L. REv. 1088 (1979).
126. 443 U.S. 444 (1979).
127. 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
128. More precisely, the Court endorsed the novel concept that, in school desegregation
cases, proof of a pre-1954 intentional violation coupled with the failure of school officials to
fulfill their continuous obligation to dismantle this dual system raises the presumption of
present-day discriminatory intent. Columbus Bd ofEduc., 443 U.S. at 444.
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inaction. 1 29
The issue of the role of foreseeable consequences in determining
intent was laid to rest by the Court when it restated its position in Fee-
ney that a showing of natural and foreseeable consequences is only one
factor relevant to raising an inference of intent, and does not automati-
cally create a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination. 3 '
The Court did imply, however, that proof of foreseeable consequences
when combined with a prior history of purposeful discrimination may
raise the inference of present-day discriminatory intent.'
As the discussion turns to the analysis of Title VI litigation, the
role of intent must be viewed within the framework of Columbus and
Dayton and not ofFeeney. The typical veterans' preference case is lim-
ited in the types of evidence available and is based upon legislative
action where motivation is difficult to determine. Feeney's applicability
to other types of litigation is therefore limited. The typical Title VI
case, however, is similar to Columbus and Dayton, and deals with the
policies and practices of smaller administrative bodies (e.g, school
boards or officials in education cases, and municipal governing bodies
such as city councils in hospital closings) that are dramatically smaller
in membership than state or federal legislative bodies. The small size
of such bodies, combined with their proximity to the potential impact,
render more relevant and realistic such Arlington Heghts evidentiary
considerations as foreseeability of consequences, historical context, and
departures from normal procedures. 1
32
The discussion of intent and impact standards as they relate to
Title VI litigation must also be guided by Title VII analysis and the
deference the Court has shown to congressional intent in that area, as
well as the theoretical framework the Court has developed in Title VII
adjudication. The following sections will analyze and examine Title VI
in reference to its legislative history, Supreme Court rulings, and recent
approaches taken by the circuit courts of appeals.
129. Id at 455,461.
130. Dayton Bd of Educ., 443 U.S. at 536 n.9. The Court stated that "proof of foresee-
able consequences is one type of quite relevant evidence of racially discriminatory purpose,
and it may itself show a failure to fulfill the duty to eradicate the consequences of prior
purposefully discriminatory conduct." Id
131. Columbus Bd of Educ., 443 U.S. at 464.
132. Columbus and Dayton suggest, then, that at least with regard to school discrimina-
tion type cases, Feeney was a judicial aberration, designed to meet the particular facts.
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C. Title VI: From Lau to Bakke and Beyond
1. Legislative History
In enacting Title VI, Congress recognized a need for broad-based
legislation applicable to every program involving federal financial
assistance. 133 More specifically, the legislative history of the Act indi-
cates an underlying dual congressional purpose: first, to end racial dis-
crimination, and second, to assure that federal funds would not be used
to support such discrimination.
134
Congressional authority to enact legislation prohibiting race-con-
scious state action is generally founded on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.135 However, remarks by Senator Humphrey, sponsor of the bill,
indicate intentional Title VI coverage beyond the constitutional pur-
view over state acts, including situations where federal funds support
private, segregated institutions. Title VI was "designed to insure that
Federal funds are spent in accordance with the Constitution and the
moral sense of the Nation."1 36 This condition on the receipt of funds
by private as well as public institutions is rooted in the Article I, section
8 spending powers of Congress. 37 Through the use of such conditional
appropriations, Congress has converted its enumerated power to tax
and spend for the "general welfare" into the power to regulate in areas
not expressly permitted through its other Article I, section 8 enumer-
133. Statements found in the legislative history in support of such broad legislation con-
sistently make reference to several older statutes that, in effect, authorized the existence of
"separate but equal" facilities and that were, therefore, of questionable constitutional valid-
ity after Brown. See, e.g., 110 CONG. Rnc. 6544 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey), 7062
(remarks of Sen. Pastore), 7102 (remarks of Sen. Ribicoft). The Hill-Burton Act of 1946, 42
U.S.C. §§ 291, 291o-I, authorized construction grants for public and nonpublic hospitals,
including those providing separate facilities for separate population groups, on the condition
that such facilities were of like quality and would be provided equitably on the basis of
need. The Act was declared unconstitutional in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp.,
323 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964). The Second Morrill Act of
1890 ch. 841, § 4, 26 Stat. 419, (codified as amended in 7 U.S.C. §§ 321-329 (1976)), pro-
vided annual grants to land-grant colleges, including those that were maintained separately
for white and black students, provided funds were divided equitably between the two
groups.
134. See 110 CONG. REc. 6544 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
135. See supra note 48.
136. 110 CONG. REc. 6544 (1964).
137. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. The spending power is effectuated by the
Necessary and Proper Clause, which authorizes Congress "[t]o make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing [enumerated] Powers. ... "
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 247-48
(1978).
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ated powers.
138
138. The spending power has provided the constitutional basis for a system of federal
grants that has increased dramatically-from 160 programs dispensing $8.3 billion in 1963,
to more than 447 programs dispensing $82.9 billion in 1980 (representing a 900% increase).
Note, Federal Grants and the Tenth Amendment: "Things As They Are" and Fiscal Federal-
ism, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 130, 135 n.15 (1981). This increase has transformed federal aid
into an effective vehicle for implementing national policy. The aim of conditions attached to
federal grants has also changed over the years, from insuring the primary objective of the
grant, to realizing general policy goals that are merely secondary to the original purpose of
the allocation. Title VI is a case in point, whereby the receipt of all federal funds, including
educational aid for the economically and educationally disadvantaged, linguistic minorities,
and handicapped students, as well as women's and desegregation programs, is conditioned
upon the absence of racially discriminatory practices and policies within the recipient insti-
tution or school district.
Where recipients are state or local governmental agencies, a constitutional conflict
emerges between the spending power and the Tenth Amendment, which states that "[t]he
powers not delegated to the United States . . . . nor prohibited . . . to the States, are re-
served to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. In fact, the
failure of the Constitution either to grant the power to establish a national system of educa-
tion to the federal government, or to expressly prohibit such power from being exercised by
the states, serves as the legal foundation for the states' voluntary assumption of the responsi-
bility through state constitutional provisions. Such state education clauses typically guaran-
tee, in varying terminology, a system of free public schools for all children within a given
age range, and further grant to the state legislature the power to enact enabling legislation to
enforce the constitutional guarantee. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. 10, § I ("general and effi-
cient" education); MD. CONST. art. 8, § 1, and N.J. CONST. art. 8, § 4, 1 1 ("thorough and
efficient" education); WASH. CONST. art. 9, § 2, MINN. CONST. art. 13, § 1, and ARIz. CONST.
art. 11, § 1 ("general and uniform" education).
It can be argued that conditional federal grants for education force states to relinquish
their plenary power to educate in exchange for federal aid. The courts have generally distin-
guished, however, between coercion and inducement, holding that federal grants that merely
induce state compliance with their conditions are permissible, while those that coerce or
mandate compliance inhibit state and local autonomy in contravention of the Tenth
Amendment. The coercion-inducement distinction hinges upon the ability of the recipient
to avoid the conditions merely by declining the grant. See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548, 585-90 (1937) (grants are optional; conditions are attached to grants; therefore,
conditions attached to grants are optional); see also Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 n.13 (1981) (acknowledging potential conffict between spending
power and Tenth Amendment); Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130 (1979) (acknowledg-
ing that authority of federal government to establish conditions bears close link to primary
purpose of act in question relating to desegregation); Walker Field v. Adams, 606 F.2d 290,
297 (10th Cir. 1979) (ability of recipient to avoid conditions by declining grant brings condi-
tions within constitutional limits of spending power to induce compliance).
For an updated discussion of the potential conffict between the spending power and the
Tenth Amendment, and a reanalysis of the coercion-inducement test, see Note, supra. The
author argues that the coercion-inducement distinction drawn in Steward Machine must be
reconsidered in view of the increased dependence on federal aid to support essential local
government services, as well as the nature of grant conditions that are merely peripheral to
the primary purpose of the allocation. A clear example of such ancillary conditions placed
upon the receipt of essential funds is the precondition of Title IX compliance (race discrimi-
nation prohibited in education programs receiving federal aid) placed upon the receipt of
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The legislative history of Title VI indicates a marked failure of
Congress to define "discrimination" as prohibited by the Act. The ab-
sence of such definition or guidelines goes to the heart of the present
issue as to whether Title VI prohibits practices that lead to discrimina-
tory effects or solely those based upon discriminatory intent. 139 The
most commonly expressed concerns voiced by Title VI opponents were
that the bill's failure expressly to define "discrimination" 4 would lead
to a triggering of fund termination merely by "an 'express finding' of a
failure to comply with an undefined prohibition against discrimina-
tion";1 41 that the "concept of 'racial imbalance' would hover like a
black cloud over every transaction, every loan, every grant, and every
award or every assistance rendered under a Federal or federally
financed program"; 142 and finally, that a college which "[did] not ac-
cept a colored person because it [did] not have room for him, or...
turn[ed] him down for some other good reason' 143 would be charged
with a violation under the Act.
Proponents of the bill responded that the prohibition of discrimi-
nation under Title VI would be "no more than what our Constitution
guarantees";144 that "there [exists] a constitutional restriction in the use
of Federal funds; and that Title VI simply spells out the procedure to
be used in enforcing that restriction."'' 45 The language used by both
proponents and opponents of the bill-e.g., "treatment," "racial imbal-
ance"-and the pervasiveness throughout congressional debate of sta-
tistics on segregated institutions, indicate a fundamental congressional
understanding of an effects standard against which to measure alleged
Title VI violations. Quoting from President Kennedy's message to
Congress of June 19, 1963, Senator Humphrey stated more specifically:
"Simple justice requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all
federal funds to promote racial desegregation under the Emergency School Aid Act, 20
U.S.C. § 3191-3207 (Supp. IV 1980).
139. Senator Humphrey himself, sponsor of the bill, spoke of a "general requirement
that the local authority refrain from racial discrimination in treatment of pupils and teach-
ers." 110 CONG. REC. 6545 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey) (emphasis added). He
thus employed the same "treatment" language as used in congressional discussion of Title
VII: "Fair treatment in employment is as important as any other area of civil rights." Id at
6547. As shown above, the courts have repeatedly applied an effects standard when evaluat-
ing facially neutral statutes that result in disparate impact upon protected groups. See supra
notes 35-47 and accompanying text.
140. 110 CONG. REC. at 5610 (remarks of Sen. Ervin).
141. Id at 5251 (remarks of Sen. Talmadge).
142. Id at 1619 (remarks of Sen. Abernethy).
143. Id at 6052 (remarks of Sen. Johnston).
144. Id at 6533 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
145. Id at 13,333 (remarks of Sen. Ribicofl).
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races contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages, en-
trenches, subsidizes, or results in racial discrimination." 146
The bill that was ultimately enacted as Title VI began as House
Resolution 7152,147 an omnibus bill designed to eliminate racial dis-
crimination in voting, federally assisted programs, and employment.
Title VI of the bill gave the executive branch the power to withhold
funds from program beneficiaries found to discriminate on the basis of
race. 141 Only one set of fact-finding hearings on the bill was con-
ducted, with the House adopting a considerably revised version.149 The
Senate held no hearings, did not consider the bill in committee, 150 and
made few changes in Title VI as originally introduced.' 5 1
Both the House hearing record and the Judiciary Committee re-
port shed light on the concerns expressed in Congress as to the Title VI
definition of "discrimination." Two members present remarked that
the word "discrimination" had no fixed meaning and had not been de-
fined in the bill under consideration. 52  Several members, using the
terminology of "racial imbalance" expressed concerns over the poten-
tial overbreadth of Title VI.153 During cross-examination by Represen-
146. Id at 6543 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) (emphasis added).
147. See Civil Rights: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 649-60 (1963) (quoting text of H.R. 7152) [hereinafter cited as
House Subcomm. Hearings].
148. Id at 659. The original text provided: "Sec. 601. Notwithstanding any provision to
the contrary in any law of the United States providing or authorizing direct or indirect
financial assistance for or in connection with any program or activity by way of grant, con-
tract, loan, insurance, guaranty, or otherwise, no such law shall be interpreted as requiring
that such financial assistance shall be furnished in circumstances under which individuals
participating in or benefiting from the program or activity are discriminated against on the
ground of race, color, religion, or national origin .... "
149. House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 147 (condensing 2649 pages of transcribed
material, including presentations by 101 witnesses and correspondents). See also HOUSE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1963, H.R. REP. No. 194, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 44, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2412 (additional views of Rep.
Meader summarizing subcommittee action) [hereinafter cited as HouSE JUDICIARY RE-
PORT]. For a detailed discussion of the drafting of Title VI, see generally Abernathy, Title
VI and the Constitutiom" A Regulatory Modelfor Defning "Discrimination," 70 GEO. L.J. 1
(1981).
150. The Senate held hearings only on public accommodations. See Civil Rights Public
Accommodations: Hearings on S. 1732 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 686,passim (1963).
151. See BNA OPERATIONS MANUAL, THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT oF 1964: TEXT, ANALY-
SIS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 289, 298 (1964) (explaining Sen. Humphrey's position that Senate
had made no substantive changes in Title VI bill).
152. See HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 149, at 106, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2473 (minority views of Reps. Poff and Cramer).
153. See House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 147, at 1424 (remarks of Rep. Cramer);
id at 1580 (remarks of Rep. Meader).
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tative Cramer, HEW Secretary Celebrezze seemed to endorse an effects
standard for determining discrimination under Title VI, suggesting ra-
cial balance as the goal of the Act. 54 Under further questioning by
Representative Meader, Secretary Celebrezze posited that steps would
be taken under Title VI if HEW found that racial imbalance in a par-
ticular school system caused the same problems as traditional
segregation. 155
Debates on the floor of Congress, as well as the House hearings
and Judiciary Committee report, therefore indicate confusion and con-
cern as to the definition of "discrimination" under Title VI. Considera-
ble legislative rhetoric was expended in endorsing an effects standard
while at the same time reaffirming the constitutional underpinnings of
the Act. The issue, however, was never expressly brought to closure at
the congressional level. Congress, on the other hand, expressly author-
ized and mandated the executive departments and agencies awarding
federal aid to adopt their own regulations against which to measure
compliance and to effectuate enforcement proceedings. 56 The regula-
tions promulgated by HEW pursuant to such statutory authority ex-
pressly provide for an effects standard.'57 If Congress was avoiding the
154. See id at 1514 (remarks of Secretary Celebrezze) (funds could be terminated for
schools rejecting federal "assistance" to end imbalance if Title VI passed).
155. Id. at 1519 (remarks of Secretary Celebrezze).
156. Section 602 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l, provides: "Each Federal department
and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program or
activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is
authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 2000d of this title with respect
to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability
which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the
financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken." See Abernathy, supra
note 149, at 28, for support of the proposition that the regulatory mandate of Title VI grew
out of a subcommittee compromise on the definition of discrimination under the statute,
delegating to each agency the authority to define the term within the context of the agency's
programs and scope of power.
157. 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(1) (1980) provides: "A recipient under any program to which
this part applies may not directly or through contractual or other arrangements, on ground
of race, color, or national origin: (ii) Provide any service, financial aid, or other benefit to an
individual which is different, or is provided in a different manner, from that provided to
others under the program; (iv) Restrict an individual in any way in the enjoyment of any
advantage or privilege enjoyed by others receiving any service, financial aid, or other benefit
under the program."
The foregoing regulation as pertains to education was contained in 45 C.F.R.
§ 80.3(b)(ii), (iv) prior to May 9, 1980. Prior to that date, Title VI as applied to education
programs was administered within the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. With
the dismantling of that department and the creation of a separate Department of Education,
rulemaking and enforcement powers under Title VI as to education programs were trans-
ferred to the latter. See Margulies, Bilingual Education, RemedialLanguage Instruction, Title
VI1 and Proof of Discriminatory Purpose: .4 Suggested Approach, 17 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
issue by passing it on to the administrative agencies, the solution was
temporary. As the arm of Title VI began to reach beyond the geo-
graphic area of the South, where the intent/effects distinction was less
relevant, and as the Court began to expand the group of protected
classes under the Equal Protection Clause (while at the same time nar-
rowing the range of facts under which judicial relief could be granted
based upon proof of intent), the HEW effects standard became prob-
lematic and a fertile ground for litigation.
2 Judicial Confusion
The current split in judicial authority as to the controlling stan-
dard of review in Title VI cases derives from the difficulty met by lower
courts in attempting to reconcile several leading Supreme Court opin-
ions of the past decade. As the Court moved through the 1970's, it
struggled to define the contours of Title VII and equal protection guar-
antees as well as the power of Congress to enact remedial legislation.
During that same period, the Court was forced to define the scope of
Title VI in a series of cases challenging a diverse set of policies, prac-
tices, and legislative enactments. As the distinction between the dis-
criminatory impact standard of Title VII and the discriminatory intent
standard of equal protection analysis evolved, the Court attempted to
find a place for Title VI analysis in a broader matrix of judicial review.
The first case to reach the Court was Lau v. Nichols,'58 a class
action suit brought by non-English-speaking Chinese students against
the San Francisco public school system. Plaintiffs alleged that the sys-
tem had violated Title VI as well as HEW's implementing regulations
in its failure to provide such students with equal educational opportu-
nities. 59 The plaintiffs did not claim that school officials had intended
to harm Chinese-speaking children but merely that those officials' fail-
ure to provide meaningful education resulted in a harm unique to such
students. Presenting evidence of acts of neglectful omission rather than
of intentional commission, the plaintiffs bolstered their argument on
statutory and regulatory violations with interpretive guidelines pub-
PROBS. 99 (1982), for a detailed discussion of the Title VI statute and regulations and a
suggested intent model of analysis as applied to the educational rights of linguistic minority
children.
158. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
159. The case was also brought on Fourteenth Amendment equal protection grounds.
The Ninth Circuit had denied relief, affirming the opinion of the lower court that there was
no violation of the Equal Protection Clause or Title VI. Following the principle that consti-
tutional issues should not be reached if there exist narrower grounds for a decision, the
Court relied solely upon statutory grounds and reversed the decision below. Id at 566.
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lished by HEW subsequent to promulgation of formal regulations. In
addition to general regulations promulgated pursuant to statutory au-
thority1 60 that implied an effects standard,161 HEW had issued a 1968
guideline 162 stating that "[s]chool systems are responsible for assuring
that students of a particular race, color, or national origin are not de-
nied the opportunity to obtain the education generally obtained by
other students in the system."'163 Two years later, in a memorandum to
school districts, HEW made this guideline more specific as to linguistic
minority students.'"
Basing its decision upon the foregoing regulations and guidelines,
the Court in Lau deferred to the administrative determination of an
effects standard under Title VI and held that "[d]iscrimination is
barred which has that effect even though no purposeful design is pres-
ent." ' 65 The Court further reaffirmed the power of the federal govern-
ment to establish the terms on which its funds are allocated to the
states. As a precondition to its receipt of federal funds for a variety of
instructional programs, the defendant school district had signed con-
160. See supra note 156.
161. See supra note 157.
162. It should be noted that administrative guidelines do not bear the force of law as do
formal regulations. The latter are published pursuant to statutory authority that requires the
publication of proposed regulations in the Federal Register, a minimum 60 day period for
public comment, and a 45 day period of "laying before" Congress the final regulations prior
to their taking effect. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1981). The issue raised
in Lau as to the weight to be afforded administrative guidelines that interpret formal regula-
tions that, in turn, interpret legislative enactments has yet to be decided with respect to the
rights guaranteed linguistic minority students under Title VI. The Court in Lau failed to
order a specific remedy, but merely defined the educational rights of students under Title VI
in terms of "equality of treatment," and further defined equality in terms of "meaningful
education." 414 U.S. at 566.
During the closing days of the Carter administration, the newly formed Department of
Education published proposed regulations as to the rights of linguistic minority students
pursuant to Title VI. 45 Fed. Reg. 52,052 (1980). These proposed rules mandated specific
entrance and exit criteria, instructional services, and staffing requirements within the context
of bilingual education. Opponents of bilingual education viewed the regulations as overly
intrusive into local decisionmaking. Proponents of the concept opposed the regulations as
well, but on the grounds that the federal government had not gone far enough in mandating
services for identified students. The proposed regulations were withdrawn by the Depart-
ment of Education in the early days of the Reagan administration, leaving Title VI interpre-
tation on the rights of linguistic minority students subject to the confusion wrought by the
Lau decision.
163. 33 Fed. Reg. 4956 (1968).
164. 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595 (1970). The guidelines stated: "Where inability to speak and
understand the English language excludes national origin-minority group children from ef-
fective participation in the educational program offered by a school district, the district must
take affirmative steps to rectify the language deficiency in order to open its instructional
program to these students." Id
165. 414 U.S. at 568.
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tractual assurances of compliance with Title VI and "'all requirements
imposed by or pursuant to the Regulation. . .issued pursuant to that
title . . ,'" and further agreed to immediately "take any measures
necessary to effectuate this agreement."'166 Plaintiff students could
therefore sue the school district as third party beneficiaries of those
assurances.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun, cited judicial precedent for the proposi-
tion that the validity of a regulation promulgated pursuant to a statu-
tory provision such as section 602 of Title VI "'will be sustained so
long as it is "reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legisla-
tion." ' "167 The guidelines in question were deemed to meet that test.
Citing additional precedent for the great weight to be afforded depart-
mental regulations and consistent administrative construction, 68 Jus-
tice Stewart concurred with the majority in upholding an effects
standard under Title VI. 169
In Lau, the Court deferred to administrative interpretation, reaf-
firmed federal authority to establish conditions upon the receipt of
funds, and espoused the "contractual agreement" argument. Thus, it
reasonably can be inferred that, in enacting Title VI with its broad del-
egation of rulemaking and enforcement powers to administrative agen-
cies, Congress legislated broader protections than those afforded under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,170 however, the
Court cast serious doubt upon the implicit holding of Lau. In Bakke,
the Court reasoned in dicta that the contours of Title VI protection are
determined by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. This "doctrine of coextensiveness," as it has come to be called,
was enunciated by a severely fragmented Court' 7 1 which left several
166. Id at 568-69.
167. Id at 571 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Mourning v. Family Publications Serv.,
Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973) (citing Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268,
280-81 (1969))).
168. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972); Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
169. 414 U.S. at 571 (Stewart, J., concurring).
170. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). The case was brought by Allan Bakke, a white 37 year-old
mechanical engineer who had twice been denied admission to the defendant University of
California at Davis Medical School. The plaintiff contended that the defendant's special
admissions program, which reserved 16 of the 100 seats each year for minority students (a
race-specific preference), resulted in his exclusion in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI.
171. The nine Justices authored six separate opinions with no more than four Justices
concurring in the reasoning on any one point. Five agreed that the particular program
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issues unresolved, one of them being the standard of review applicable
in Title VI cases.'72
Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court in Bakke and
wrote a separate opinion in which he concluded that, in view of the
clear legislative intent, "Title VI must be held to proscribe only those
racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or
the Fifth Amendment."' 73 Citing statements made by sponsors of the
bill in the House'74 and in the Senate, 17 5 Justice Powell concluded that
Title VI embodied constitutional principles. 17 6 This view was shared by
four additional members of the Court who joined in an opinion written
by Justice Brennan, which was confined "to the case before us." '17 7
Based upon an extensive analysis of the legislative history of Title
VI,178 these Justices concluded that the purpose of the statute was not
to expand the concept of discrimination, but merely to extend "the con-
straints of the Fourteenth Amendment to private parties who receive
federal funds."' The Brennan group cited statements made during
Senate debate of the bill to support their conclusion that Congress had
intended to preserve flexibility in defining Title VI prohibitions. They
believed the statute's standard "was that of the Constitution and one
that could and should be administratively and judicially applied."' 80
under review was impermissible, as the university could have adopted less discriminatory
means to achieve its goal of student diversity, and that Bakke should be ordered admitted.
See 438 U.S. at 271 (Powell, J.); id at 408 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). A different group of five agreed that a university may constitutionally consider race in
its admissions procedures in order to overcome substantial, chronic minority under-
representation in the medical profession. See id at 269 (Powell, J.); id at 324 (Brennan,
White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
172. Following Court practice, all six opinions set aside the constitutional question and
proceeded directly to the statutory claim under Title VI. The threshold issue was whether
the plaintiff had a private right to sue under Title VI. The Court failed to resolve this issue.
For a general discussion of the private right to sue under Title VI, see supra note 3.
173. 438 U.S. at 287 (Powell, J.).
174. Id at 286 n.21.
175. Id at n.22.
176. For a discussion of the legislative history of Title VI with regard to the constitu-
tional scope of the statute and the failure of Congress expressly to define the "discrimina-
tion" to be prohibited, see supra notes 139-57 and accompanying text.
177. 438 U.S. at 325 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Stevens, joined in a separate opinion by the Chief Justice and
Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, stated that neither the language of Title VI nor prior inter-
pretation suggests that it is simply a constitutional appendage. Id at 418 (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
178. Id at 329-35 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
179. I d at 327.
180. Id at 338.
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According to the Brennan opinion, both the failure of Congress ex-
pressly to define "discrimination" under the law, and the congressional
debate surrounding that issue, reflect an awareness of the evolutionary
change that constitutional law regarding racial discrimination was un-
dergoing in 1963 and 1964.181 The five Justices summed up their dis-
cussion of the issue by stating:
Congress' equating of Title VI's prohibition with the commands
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, its refusal precisely to
define that racial discrimination which it intended to prohibit,
and its expectation that the statute would be administered in a
flexible manner, compel the conclusion that Congress intended
the meaning of the statute's prohibition to evolve with the inter-
pretation of the commands of the Constitution.
8 2
The doctrine set forth in Lau stated that impact alone is in some
contexts sufficient to establish a prima facie violation under Title VI.
Justice Brennan and his colleagues were well aware that their views
concerning Title VI's definition of racial discrimination as absolutely
coextensive with that of the Constitution, when read in light of the
Court's enunciation in Washington v. Davis 83 that an intent standard
should be applied in equal protection adjudication, seriously undercut
this doctrine. Thus, while the Brennan opinion does not expressly seek
to overrule Lau, it casts "serious doubts concerning the correctness of
what appears to be the premise of that decision." '84
Equating the Title VI standard of discrimination with that of the
Constitution raises several problems. In support of their argument that
Congress intended the Title VI standard to evolve with the Constitu-
tion, Justice Brennan and his colleagues cited testimony of Attorney
General Robert Kennedy in hearings before the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, and stated that:
[R]egulations had not been written into the legislation itself be-
cause the rules and regulations defining discrimination might dif-
fer from one program to another so that the term would assume
different meanings in different contexts. This determination to
preserve flexibility in the administration of Title VI was shared
by the legislation's supporters.'8 5
181. Id. at 339-40.
182. Id at 340.
183. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
184. 438 U.S. at 352 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
185. Id at 339 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (footnotes omitted).
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If the congressional objective as stated above was to permit the mean-
ing of discrimination to be determined by administrative regulations
based upon differences among programs-that is, to preserve adminis-
trative flexibility--then an evolving constitutional standard applicable
to all situations at a given time and varying only at different points in
time would undercut that objective. Furthermore, if Congress intended
that agencies might formulate regulations merely within evolving con-
stitutional limits, then the Court's opinion in Bakke would invalidate
the HEW regulation establishing an effects standard as upheld in
Lau.'86 However, both the Powell' 87 and Brennan 188 opinions mention
this regulation with approval, the latter clearly stating that such regula-
tions are entitled to considerable deference in construing Title VI. Fi-
nally, although members of Congress in debating what was to become
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 often made reference to the entire Act as
enforcing constitutional rights,8 9 the Court in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. 190 and subsequent cases has interpreted Title VII of the Act inde-
pendently of the constitutional standard even in post-Davis opinions.
It can also be argued that Bakke did not overrule Lau as to the
governing standard of review. In fact, a distinction can be drawn be-
tween the significant issues of each case. In Lau, the question under
review was whether the effects standard as enunciated in HEW's regu-
lations to Title VI was in accord with the statute, whereas in Bakke the
applicable standard of proof was not considered by the Court since the
university's intent to discriminate was undisputed. Finally, it is sug-
gested that the real issue in Bakke was whether Title VI prohibits all
facially discriminatory policies per se or, like the Equal Protection
Clause, only those racial classifications that do not promote a compel-
ling state interest. Perhaps the "doctrine of coextensiveness" goes to
the level of review, le., rational basis versus strict scrutiny, to be ap-
plied in Title VI cases rather than to the standard of review, i e., intent
versus impact.' 9 '
186. See supra note 157.
187. 438 U.S. at 303-04 (Powell, J.).
188. Id at 341-42 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
189. See 110 CONG. REC. 1540 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Lindsay); id at 1588 (remarks of
Rep. Tuck); id at 1593-94 (remarks of Rep. Farbstein); id at 1600 (remarks of Rep. Dan-
iels). See also Abernathy, supra note 149; Note, Test Validation in the Schools, 58 TEx. L.
REV. 1123, 1128-30 (1980).
190. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). For a discussion of Griggs, see supra notes 35-47 and accompa-
nying text.
191. See Note, Title V1" The Impact/Intent Debate Enters the Municipal Services Arena,
55 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 124, 130 n.32, 141 (1980).
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Two cases decided by the Court subsequent to Bakke, as well as a
series of lower court opinions, provide additional insight into congres-
sional intent as to the goals of Title VI and the underlying meaning of
the Bakke opinions. In Board of Education v. Harris,"92 the Court was
presented with the issue of whether Congress intended eligibility for
assistance under the Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA) 193 to be
gauged by a discriminatory impact or a discriminatory intent standard.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, used the legislative his-
tory of ESAA to support the conclusion that a disparate impact stan-
dard governs teacher assignments under the Act. One item drawn from
congressional debates and relied upon by the Court in Harris has par-
ticular significance with regard to Title VI interpretation. The Stennis
Amendment, which later became incorporated into the final version of
ESAA, contains two separate clauses providing for the uniform appli-
cation of guidelines and criteria established pursuant to ESAA and
pursuant to Title VI, respectively.'94 The dissenting Justices, in an
opinion by Justice Stewart joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist,
held that since the amendment applies to Title VI as well as to ESAA,
and since the Court in Bakke had enunciated an intent standard under
Title VI, then a discriminatory intent standard must be construed to
apply under ESAA.195 The majority, however, held that it is not incon-
sistent with prior Court interpretation to find that the Stennis Amend-
ment established different standards of review under ESAA and Title
VI, as section 703(a) of the Act refers to ESAA while section 703(b)
192. 444 U.S. 130 (1979).
193. Emergency School Aid Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3191-3207 (1981). This law provides
federal fihancial assistance "to meet the special needs incident to the elimination of minority
group segregation ... in elementary and secondary schools." Id § 3192(b)(1). The Act
further declares an educational agency ineligible for assistance if, after the date of the Act, it
had in effect any practice "which results in the disproportionate demotion or dismissal of
instructional or other personnel from minority groups" or "otherwise engage(s) in discrimi-
nation... in the hiring, promotion, or assignment of employees." Id § 3196(c)(1)(B). The
facts of the case are as follows: The plaintiff Board of Education of the City of New York
applied for ESAA assistance but was denied by HEW based upon statistical evidence dem-
onstrating a pattern of racially disproportionate assignments of minority teachers in relation
to minority students enrolled at the respective schools. The Second Circuit affirmed the
opinion of the lower court and rejected the school system's contention that HEW was re-
quired to establish that the statistical disparities had resulted from purposeful or intentional
discrimination in the constitutional sense.
194. 20 U.S.C. § 3193 (1981) states: "(a) It is the policy of the United States that guide-
lines and criteria established pursuant to this subchapter shall be applied uniformly in all
regions of the United States .... (b) It is the policy of the United States that guidelines
and criteria established pursuant to title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d-5 shall be applied uniformly in all regions of the United States ..
195. 444 U.S. at 158-60 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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refers to Title VI. The majority refused to reach the issue as to the
governing standard of review under Title VI, since there exists no indi-
cation in either the ESAA or Title VI legislation that the two Acts were
intended to be coextensive. The Court, however, did suggest that Con-
gress may have imposed a lower standard under ESAA, by which only
ESAA funds are disallowed when a violation is found, than under Title
VI, which carries the broader sanction of withdrawal of all federal
funds from the recipient school district in the face of noncompliance.
In Harris, we find the Court again struggling to define the con-
tours of prohibited discrimination based upon vague statutory lan-
guage and ambiguous legislative history. The majority appears to be
drawing a fine line distinction between ESAA and Title VI, based upon
second-guessing of congressional policy considerations as to the reach
of sanctions, in order to reconcile its present analysis with that of
Bakke. The dissent, on the other hand, appears to be bootstrapping an
intent standard under ESAA onto their interpretation of 'the plurality
view in Bakke. One insightful piece of information, however, does
emerge from the Harris case. At least two members of the present
Court, Justices Powell and Rehnquist, believed that Title VI is gov-
erned by an intent standard.'96
One year after Harris, in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 97 the Court shed
an additional glimmer of light on Title VI interpretation. As in Bakke,
the Court was faced with a constitutional challenge to a program that
employed racial criteria in a remedial context. This time the issue was
not university admissions but rather the minority business enterprise
provision of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977.198 Chief Jus-
tice Burger, in a plurality opinion joined by Justices White and Powell,
cited Lau in support of the proposition that Congress may use racial or
ethnic criteria as a condition for the receipt of federal funds. The opin-
ion notes similarities between the program in question and the federal
spending program reviewed in Lau:
In Lau, a language barrier "effectively foreclosed" non-English-
speaking Chinese pupils from access to the educational opportu-
nities .... It had not been shown that this had resulted from
196. For a detailed discussion of ESAA legislation and the Harris case, see Note, Ineligi-
bility Under the Emergency School AidAct: .4 Disparate Impact Standard, 59 NEB. L. REV.
1127 (1980).
197. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
198. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f(2) (1982). The action was brought by associations of construc-
tion contractors and subcontractors seeking to prevent enforcement of the provision that
state and local grantees must set aside a minimum of 10% of federal funds granted for public
works projects to be used for procurement of services or supplies from businesses owned by
minority group members.
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any discrimination,purposeful or otherwise, or from other unlaw-
ful acts. Nevertheless, we upheld the constitutionality of a fed-
eral regulation applicable to public school systems receiving
federal funds that prohibited the utilization of "criteria or meth-
ods of administration which have the effect . . . of defeating...
accomplishment of the [educational] program as respect individ-
uals of a particular race, color, or national origin."
• . . The MBE program, like the federal regulations re-
viewed in Lau, primarily regulates state action in the use of fed-
eral funds voluntarily sought and accepted by the grantees
subject to statutory and administrative conditions. 99
Within the context of the discussion, the "program approved in Lau"
as cited by the Court undoubtedly refers to the federal program of con-
ditioning receipt of federal funds under Title VI upon compliance with
HEW regulations imposing an effects standard. The opinion, therefore,
appears to imply an impact or effects standard for Title VI predicated
upon contract principles: As a precondition to receipt of funds, Title
VI grantees give contractual assurances that they will comply with the
law and the implementing regulations of the appropriate agency. This
contractual agreement argument is reminiscent of the majority opinion
in Lau.2°
Chief Justice Burger and his colleagues further noted that the
MBE statutory provision in question did not violate Title VI. 0° The
Burger group made this last notation absent any reference to the consti-
tutional underpinnings of Title VI. Justice Powell 2 02 and Justice Mar-
shall, however, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmunz°3 in two
separate concurring opinions, upheld the provision in question under
Title VI, couched within the "coextensiveness doctrine" of Bakke.
Careful analysis of the position of each individual Justice, and of
the Court as a body, from Lau through Bakke, Harris, and Fullilove
(with Davis intervening), offers some evidence of an evolving theory of
Title VI analysis. The Harris opinions appear to represent some con-
sensus on the issue, with three dissenting Justices-Stewart, Powell,
and Rehnquist-expressly interpreting "coextensiveness" as signifying
an intent standard under Title VI. The remaining six Justices joined in
199. 448 U.S. at 479 (some emphasis added).
200. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
201. 448 U.S. at 492 n.77.
202. "Because I believe that the set-aside is constitutional, I also conclude that the pro-
gram does not violate Title VI." Id at 517 n.15 (Powell, J., concurring).
203. "On the authority of Bakke, it is also clear to me that the set-aside provision does
not violate Title VI .... In Bakke, five members of the Court were of the view that the
prohibitions of Title VI. . . are coextensive with the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment." Id at 517 n.1 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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the majority opinion and, while refusing to address the issue directly,
recognized certain policy considerations that may have led Congress to
intend a higher standard of review under Title VI than under ESAA.
The majority, however, makes no reference to "coextensiveness" and
leaves the issue wide open for future consideration.
While Harris offers some hope of judicial resolution, Fullilove be-
gins to muddy the waters again. Justices Powell, Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun reaffirmed their Bakke doctrine of "coextensiveness" in
Fullilove, but gave no insight as to its significance with regard to the
standard of review under Title VI. Indeed, it is noteworthy that all five
opinions in Fullilove proceed straight to the constitutional questions,
with the Powell and Marshall opinions merely dismissing the Title VI
claim in two footnotes respectively, and the other four opinions coii-
pletely failing to discuss the statutory claim. Not only does this method
of analysis represent a marked departure from Court policy, whereby
constitutional claims are set aside where there exist narrower grounds
for review,2°4 but it further stands in sharp contrast to the Court's ap-
proach in Bakke, wherein the Title VI statutory claim was addressed at
the outset. Perhaps this departure represents further evidence of a per-
vasive view within the Court that Title VI is completely coextensive
with the Equal Protection Clause and therefore demands identical judi-
cial analysis, thus obviating the necessity for superfluous statutory
discussion.
The majority opinion in Fullilove, written by Chief Justice Burger
and joined by Justices White and Powell, is particularly perplexing and
inconsistent with those Justices' respective positions in prior cases.
Both the Chief Justice and Justice White had joined in the Harris ma-
jority, which recognized the possibility of an intent standard under Ti-
tle VI. Justice White had further espoused the "coextensiveness
doctrine" in Bakke. On the other hand, Justice Powell's positions from
Bakke to Fullilove offer the most consistency. In Harris, he joined with
the dissent and interpreted "coextensiveness" under Bakke as imposing
the constitutional standard of intent upon Title VI. In Fu/i/ove, he
joined in the Chief Justice's opinion but clarified his position on "coex-
tensiveness" in a separate concurring opinion.
Alternatively, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun appear
to be moving toward an intent standard under Title VI, consistently
espousing "coextensiveness" in Bakke and Fullilove, questioning the
continued vitality of the Lau impact standard in Bakke, and directly
204. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 272
(1977); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974).
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implying an intent standard in Harris. The only evidence of Justice
Stevens' position is his joining in the majority opinion in Harris, an
indication that he may lean toward an intent standard. Justices Powell
and Rehnquist are the most consistent of all on the issue, having joined
in the Harris dissent expressly declaring an intent standard. The posi-
tions of the Chief Justice and Justice White are the most difficult to
determine, however, as they leaned with the majority toward an intent
standard in Harris, yet shifted one year later to an effects standard in
Fullilove. Based upon the foregoing analysis, it seems reasonable to
conclude that at least six members of the present Court would uphold
an intent standard under Title VI, with the positions of the Chief Jus-
tice as well as Justices White and O'Connor left uncertain.
The foregoing analysis of Supreme Court decisions throughout the
1970's manifests a struggle within the Court to define the contours of
constitutional and statutory protections prohibiting racial classifica-
tions, based upon established principles of statutory construction, an
evolving equal protection doctrine, and present-day policy considera-
tions. The early years of the decade witnessed a lack of consensus
among the Court as to the standard of review applicable in Fourteenth
Amendment cases. That standard finally established in Davis, the
Court was faced with the task of reconciling the Davis decision with its
pre-Davis statutory analysis under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Bakke, presenting the Court with difficult political and social issues,
served as a poor case in which to resolve complex legal issues as well.
The discussion now turns to the confusion engendered by that decision
among the lower courts.
II. A View From the Circuits
A. The Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits: An Intent Standard
In Castaneda v. Picard,°5 the Fifth Circuit was presented with a
Title VI claim brought by Mexican-American children and their par-
ents challenging the defendant school district's policy of ability group-
ing, alleging inadequacy in the district's bilingual education and
205. 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981). Following a finding of noncompliance with Title VI in
1973 and the subsequent failure of the defendant school district to develop an acceptable
compliance plan, HEW instituted formal administrative enforcement proceedings to termi-
nate federal funding in 1976. The decision of an administrative law judge finding the de-
fendant not in violation of Title VI on the administrative regulations or policies issued
thereunder was affirmed in 1980 by a final decision of the Reviewing Authority of the Office
for Civil Rights. During the pendency of such proceedings, the plaintiffs initiated this suit
against the defendant school district. id at 992-93.
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language remediation programs and charging the district with discrimi-
nation in the hiring and promotion of Mexican-American teachers.
A unanimous court affirmed the decision of the court below, enter-
ing judgment in favor of the defendants on the Title VI claim. Citing
Bakke as dispositive of the plaintiffs' independent claim under Title
VI, the court stated:
In any event, since a majority of the Court has now taken the
position that Title VI proscribes the same scope of classifications
based on race as does the Equal Protection Clause ... the ques-
tion whether plaintiffs have an independent cause of action under
that statute is not a significant one in this case. 06
With regard to the faculty discrimination claim, the court cited Fee-
ney,20 7 Arlington Heights,20 8 and Davis2 09 as standing for the proposi-
tion that "[i]n order to assert a claim based upon unconstitutional racial
discrimination a party must. .. assert and prove that the governmen-
tal actor. . intended to treat similarly situated persons differently on
the basis of race."2 1 The court concluded that discriminatory intent as
well as discriminatory impact must be proved in employment discrimi-
nation suits brought under Title VI.
2 1
Plaintiffs had also claimed that the defendant's instructional pro-
gram violated Title VI, based upon the requirements of the "Lau
Guidelines" promulgated by HEW in 1975.212 The court in Castaneda
206. Id at 998 (citation omitted).
207. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
208. 429 U.S. 252 (1977)..
209. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
210. 648 F.2d at 1000 (emphasis in original).
211. Id
212. Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Task
Force Findings Specifying Remedies for Eliminating Past Educational Practices Ruled Un-
lawful under Lau v. Nichols (1975), reprinted in CENTER FOR LAW & EDUCATION, BILIN-
GUAL-BICULTURAL EDUCATION: A HANDBOOK FOR ATTORNEYS AND CULTURAL
WORKERS (Dec. 1975). The "Lau Guidelines" or "Lau Remedies" as they are commonly
known, were the product of a task force established by HEW following the Lau decision.
The guidelines were formulated as a suggested voluntary compliance plan to be imple-
mented by school districts found in noncompliance with Title VI. In fact, they have been
utilized by HEW as a benchmark against which to measure Title VI compliance. These
guidelines were not developed through the usual administrative procedures nor have they
been published in the Federal Register. Furthermore, the guidelines require bilingual edu-
cation for identified groups of students, while the Court in Lau specifically noted that com-
pliance with Title VI as to linguistic minority students might be met through bilingual
education or any one of several other permissible courses of language remediation. 414 U.S.
at 565.
Based upon the foregoing procedural and interpretive problems, the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that these guidelines were not to be given the deference customarily afforded admin-
istrative documents in determinations of statutory compliance. 648 F.2d at 1007. See also
supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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expressed serious concerns about the continuing vitality of Lau in view
of the subsequent constitutional intent standard of Davis and the "co-
extensiveness doctrine" of Bakke. The court read an intent standard
into that doctrine, stating: "We understand the clear import of Bakke
to be that Title VI, like the Equal Protection Clause, is violated only by
conduct animated by an intent to discriminate and not by conduct
which, although benignly motivated, has a differential impact on per-
sons of different races.213
An intent standard was arguably adopted by the Sixth Circuit in
Detroit Police Officers Association v. Young,214 a case involving a chal-
lenge to a voluntary, race-conscious, affirmative action plan. A careful
reading of the opinion, however, reveals no discussion of the intent is-
sue per se but an implied adoption of such a standard. The court rec-
ognized that, in view of Bakke, Title VI "forbids only that
discrimination which offends the Constitution.
'215
The issue as to the standard of review governing Title VI was indi-
rectly presented to the Seventh Circuit in Cannon v. University of Chi-
cago. 216 The central issue on appeal in that case was whether Title
IX217 incorporates an intentional discrimination or a disparate impact
test. Noting the Supreme Court's indication in Cannon218 that lower
213. 648 F.2d at 1007. In a case decided prior to Castaneda, United States v. Texas, 506
F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd, 680 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1982), the district court rejected
the argument advanced by the Justice Department that Title VI is coextensive with the
Fourteenth Amendment in Bakke-type cases but not in Lau-type cases. The court held that
the Bakke "majority's finding of coextensiveness, based upon overwhelming,evidence of
congressional intent, did not depend upon the details of each alleged act of discrimination."
506 F. Supp. at 430. The court concluded that "while Bakke does not expressly overrule
Lau, it renders that decision obsolete, insofar as it found a violation of Title VI merely on
proof of discriminatory impact without any showing of discriminatory intent, as required by
Washington v. Davis and subsequent cases." Id at 431. In its post-Castaneda decision, the
Fifth Circuit limited its discussion to constitutional and statutory claims and did not discuss
the lower court's ruling as to standards of review under Title VI.
214. 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981).
215. 608 F.2d at 691.
216. 648 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981). Following her denial of
admission to the defendant medical school in 1975, plaintiff initiated litigation charging sex
and age discrimination based upon constitutional and statutory grounds including Title IX.
On this case's first round through the courts, the Supreme Court reversed the opinions of the
lower courts and found an implied private right to sue under Title IX and remanded to the
district court. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). The case subsequently came up to the Seventh Circuit
twice, once on appeal from a denial of appellant's motion for preliminary injunction, which
was affirmed, and in the present instance, on appeal from the district court's (1) granting of
defendant's motion to dismiss based on the intent question, and (2) denial of appellant's
cross-motions to strike.
217. See supra note 17.
218. This same case had been heard by the Supreme Court on the issue of a private right
to sue. See supra note 20.
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courts should look to Title VI for guidance regarding the proper inter-
pretation of Title IX,219 the court went through an extensive analysis of
the relevant opinions in Bakke, Harris, and Fullilove, as well as subse-
quent interpretations by other lower courts, most notably the Second
Circuit.220 The Seventh Circuit in Cannon concluded that Title VI re-
quires intentional discrimination, which compels a like standard to be
adopted under Title IX.22' The court further elaborated on the stan-
dard of proof as to intent, stating: "'Discriminatory purpose'. . . im-
plies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of
consequences... ,,,222 and "'foreseeable result' . . . standing alone is
not sufficient to establish the requisite discriminatory intent. ' 223 As
stated by the Seventh Circuit, "An illegal intent to discriminate cannot
be posited solely upon a mere failure to equalize an apparent disparate
impact.-
224
B. The Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits: An Effects Standard
Shortly following the Supreme Court's decision in Bakke, the is-
sue as to the standard of review under Title VI was presented before
the Ninth Circuit in two cases, the first dealing with Title IX and the
second dealing directly with Title VI. In De La Cruz v. Tormey,
225
plaintiffs brought suit against the defendant community college district,
alleging that lack of campus child care facilities deprived them of equal
educational opportunities under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause and Title IX.
In reversing the district court's dismissal of the action, the Ninth
Circuit, with respect to the Title IX claim, noted that "[t]he Supreme
Court has employed a standard less stringent than intentional discrimi-
nation, at least for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie
case has been established, under statutes similar to Title IX.,, 226 In
219. 441 U.S. at 694-96.
220. Among the cases cited were Parents Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High School v.
Ambach, 598 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1979) (school discrimination), and Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d
612 (2d Cir. 1980) (school discrimination). See also infra notes 256-63 and accompanying
text.
221. 648 F.2d at 1109.
222. Id (quoting Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
223. 648 F.2d at 1109 (quoting Lora v. Board of Educ. 623 F.2d 248, 250 (6th Cir. 1981)
(quoting Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 462 (1979))).
224. 648 F.2d at 1110.
225. 582 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 965 (1979).
226. 582 F.2d at 61.
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support of this proposition, the court cited Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ,'
Dothard v. Rawlinson,22- and Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty229-- cases in
which an effects standard was applied to Title VII. The court further
cited Lau as reaffirming the power of the federal government to fix the
terms on which federal funds are disbursed.230 The court noted that
"in exercising that power, Congress may impose conditions on admin-
istrative action stricter than those imposed by the Constitution."''I In-
deed, the court quoted directly from Lau, stating that under Title VI
"'[d]iscrimination is barred which has that effect [ie., discrimination
among students on account of race or national origin] even though no
purposeful design is present.' "232 The Ninth Circuit made no mention
of the Bakke "coextensiveness doctrine" but appears to have relied
solely upon the contractual principle argument of the majority opinion
in Lau. 2
3 3
The Ninth Circuit cited De La Cruz and its reliance upon the Lau
effects standard several months later in Guadalupe Organization, Inc. v.
Tempe Elementary School District.234 This was an action brought by
students of Mexican-American and Yaqui origin who sought to have
bilingual-bicultural education recognized as a right guaranteed under
Title VI.
The most thoughtful and extensive analysis regarding the implica-
tions of Bakke coextensiveness upon the standard of proof governing
Title VI cases was carried out by the Third Circuit in N,4ACP v. Medi-
cal Center, Inc. 135 In that case, the Court rejected defendant's argu-
ment that the intent standard established in Lau had been overruled by
Bakke and Harris. Citing Justice Powell's opinion as well as the opin-
ion of Justice Brennan and his colleagues in Bakke, the majority in
227. 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). For a discussion of Griggs, see supra notes 35-41 and
accompanying text.
228. 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
229. 434 U.S. 136, 143 (1977).
230. 582 F.2d at 61 n.16.
231. Id
232. Id (quoting Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974)).
233. This argument was later used by the Supreme Court in the majority opinion in
Fulllove. See supra text accompanying notes 197-200.
234. 587 F.2d 1022, 1029 n.6 (9th Cir. 1978).
235. 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981). This case was brought by organizations and individu-
als representing minority, handicapped, and elderly persons residing in Wilmington, Dela-
ware who alleged that the defendants' medical center and government officials had violated
Title VI, as well as § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1975, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1981), and the
Age Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6101-07 (1981), by planning to relocate the medical
facility from the city to an outlying suburban location. In district court, the case was entitled
NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290 (D. Del. 1980).
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Medical Center drew a distinction between the types of discrimination
challenged in Lau and in Bakke but stopped short of reaching the heart
of that distinction. In Lau, plaintiffs challenged a neutral program that
had a disparate impact. In Bakke, on the other hand, the charge was
intentional discrimination in the nature of a governmental prefer-
ence.3 6 It was evident in Bakke that whatever the reach of Title VI,
the intent to discriminate was clear. The question there facing the
Court, according to Judge Weis, was "whether some forms of inten-
tional discrimination were nevertheless permissible," and he found that
"a majority of the Court concluded that those forms of intentional dis-
crimination that would survive constitutional analysis were also ex-
empt from Title VI. ' 237 The opinion goes on to state that it does not
necessarily follow "that Congress also intended the constitutional stan-
dard to control every allegation of discrimination" and that it would be
"consistent with Congress' expansive, remedial intent to interpret Title
VI as prohibiting acts that have the effect of discrimination yet permit-
ting patent preferences designed to remedy past discrimination."
238
The passages from Bakke offered in support of the foregoing con-
clusion are of mixed interpretive validity. The Brennan group did pref-
ace their holding that "Title VI goes no further in prohibiting the use of
race than the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
itself' with the words "applied to the case before us," 239 thereby limit-
ing the holding to the facts in question and implying perhaps a differ-
ent standard were the facts different. However, the merits of that
implication are severely undercut by that opinion's expressed concern
over the continued vitality of the Lau impact standard, which accord-
ing to the majority runs "contrary to our view that Title VI's definition
of racial discrimination is absolutely coextensive with the Constitu-
tion's.' '24  Judge Weis also drew out of context from Justice Powell's
opinion in Bakke, stating that Justice Powell had "used language that
may be inconsistent with Lau" but that "went on to distinguish Lau,
saying significantly, '[Tihe "preference" approved [in Lau] did not re-
sult in the denial of the relevant benefit-meaningful opportunity to
236. 657 F.2d at 1329. It should be noted that the Court's only declaration of coexten-
siveness subsequent to Bakke came in Fullilove, also a case involving a challenge of a race-
conscious preferential program. See 448 U.S. 448, 517 n.15 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring);
id at 517 n.1 (Marshall, J., concurring).
237. 657 F.2d at 1330 (Weis, J.).
238. Id
239. Id at 1329 (quoting Lau, 438 U.S. 265, 325 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Black-
mun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
240. 438 U.S. at 352.
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participate in the educational program-to anyone else.' ",241 The fore-
going distinction was drawn by Justice Powell in response to the de-
fendant medical school's citation of Lau to support the proposition that
remedial programs had been judicially approved in the past without
the heightened level of scrutiny ordinarily afforded suspect classifica-
tions. The distinction was therefore drawn within the context of the
appropriate standard of review in the sense of level of judicial scrutiny
and means-end analysis, and not with respect to the standard of proof
in the sense of intent versus impact.
Judge Weis's opinion goes on to reject the defendant's argument
that Harris further overruled Lau, since the majority in Harris had
"expressly disclaimed any necessity to pass on the standard applicable
to Title VI."242 The opinion concludes that an effects standard under
Title VI is Consistent with the legislative aim of eliminating discrimina-
tion, is in harmony with Title VII and Title VIII,2 43 and parallels regu-
lations adopted by HEW and other departments charged with
enforcing the statute.244 This final conclusion is based upon tradition-
ally recognized indicia of legislative intent and undercuts the validity
of the Supreme Court's interpretation of that intent in Bakke. How-
ever, setting aside established principles of statutory interpretation and
the legal sufficiency or logical validity of the Court's reasoning in
Bakke, the argument as to the appropriateness of an intent or effects
standard may be irrelevant with respect to the underlying meaning of
"coextensiveness" as espoused by five members of the Court in that
case.
245
241. 657 F.2d at 1329-30 (Weis, J.) (quoting Lau, 438 U.S. at 304 (Powell, _J.
concurring)).
242. 657 F.2d at 1330 (Weis, J.) (citing Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 149
(1979)).
243. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1981).
244. 657 F.2d at 1331 (Weis, J.). The opinion lists Title VI regulations adopted by other
departments. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 15.3 (1980) (Agriculture Dep't); 14 C.F.R. § 1250.103-1
(1981) (NASA); 18 C.F.R. § 1302.3 (1980) (Tennessee Valley Authority); 45 C.F.R.
§ 1010.10-2 (1980) (Community Services Admin.); 49 C.F.R. § 21.5 (1980) (Transportation
Dep't) (cited in Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d at 1331 n.8).
245. The concurring opinion of Judge Adams agreed with the foregoing distinction
drawn between the Bakke challenge to the intentional use of racial criteria in the context of
voluntary remedial actions and the Lau challenge to facially neutral acts resulting in dispa-
rate impacts. The opinion further found that the concern expressed in Harris-that the
broad sanction of federal fund termination imposed by Title VI serves as a justification for
an intent standard under Title VI-may not be appropriate in the present case where plain-
tiffs do not seek fund termination as a remedy, but rather an injunction to prevent future
discrimination. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d at 1339 (Adams, J., concurring). This dis-
tinction may adequately respond to the issues raised in Harris but fails to contravene the
clear positions taken by five Justices in Bakke and Fullilove. In a footnote to the opinion,
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Assuming arguendo an impact standard under Title VI, the Third
Circuit opinion in Medical Center includes some noteworthy discussion
as to the elements of a prima facie case under the statute, as well as
shifting burdens of production and persuasion in Title VI adjudication.
According to the majority, the prima facie case under Title VI is gov-
erned by the test of reasonableness. The allegedly disproportionate im-
pact must be measurable, definite, substantial (not de minimis), and
greater than the impact on others absent the governmental action.
2 46
Applying the Title VII "business necessity" rule and citing Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. 247 andAl1bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 48 the majority
held that a prima facie case could be established under an impact the-
ory, were the plaintiff to prove that a facially neutral policy dispropor-
tionately affected members of the protected class. The defendant must
then present evidence that the policy in question was related to a busi-
ness objective. It then remains open to the complaining party to show
that other less discriminatory means were available that would serve
the legitimate interest.2 4 9
In a separate opinion, Judge Gibbons maintained that, in a spend-
ing power statute such as Title VI, a greater burden must be placed on
the defendant to justify the redistribution of federal benefits away from
a protected class. Judge Gibbons drew a distinction between rebuttal
and justification. As to the former, the defendant could rebut the evi-
dence offered by plaintiffs by a mere showing that the impact com-
plained of will not occur. As to the latter, the defendant could justify
Judge Adams cited the broad spectrum of federally funded programs under which Title VI
challenges have been brought as a possible explanation for the divergent resolutions reached
among and within the circuits as to the intent versus impact question. Id at n.3. This
observation bears no relevance to "coextensiveness" per se, but is noteworthy with regard to
congressional intent to preserve administrative flexibility in the enforcement of Title VI, and
supports the argument that Congress intended the standard of review under the statute to be
determined on a program by program basis.
246. 657 F.2d at 1332.
247. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
248. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
249. 657 F.2d at 1334. The majority in Wl7mington rejected plaintiffs' argument that a
distinction should be drawn between discriminatory intent and impact cases, with defendant
shouldering the burden of persuasion and not merely the burden of production in the latter.
Plaintiffs based this distinction upon the theory that, in countering a prima facie case of
discriminatory impact, the defendant is presenting, in essence, an affirmative defense that
requires bearing the burden of persuasion. The Third Circuit rejected this argument based
upon the Supreme Court's analysis in Title VII effects cases (citing New York Transit Auth.
v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979)), policy considerations (illogical to impose heavier
burden on defendant in an impact case than in one where charge is unlawful animus), and
practical considerations (procedural distinction between impact and intent cases would
cause unnecessary confusion in trial courts). 657 F.2d at 1335.
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those impacts by a showing that there exist valid needs essential to de-
fendant's business or service; that the challenged plan, policy, or prac-
tice meets those needs; and that there exist no available alternative
means with a lesser impact on the protected classes. 250 This mode of
analysis, affording broader protection to members of a statutorily pro-
tected class where the distribution of federal benefits is at stake, is
based upon sound policy and is worthy of serious consideration within
the context of a Title VI impact standard. At first blush, the burden of
coming forward with proof of the absence of less discriminatory alter-
natives appears to place an undue onus upon the defendant, who, in
effect, must produce evidence of a negative. 25' However, upon closer
reflection, such a rule would force recipients of federal aid to engage in
a more reasoned decisionmaking process when formulating policies or
taking administrative action with potential impact upon racial minori-
ties. Such decisionmaking by its nature must entail a thorough prior
assessment of available alternatives. The defendant is then merely
called upon to produce evidence that should have been gathered in the
first place. Finally, as a matter of public policy and from the viewpoint
of one asking who has the most ready access to the evidence, it follows
that the risk of nonproduction on the issue of justification should be
placed on the defendant in Title VI litigation. Plaintiffs in such cases
are unlikely to enjoy privity to the decisionmaking process or to the
competing considerations that should ultimately shape the defense of
justification. Placing the burden of presenting available alternatives on
the plaintiffs would "saddle them and their expert with the task of
filling in the gaps in [the defendant's] own consideration of
alternatives. 252
250. 657 F.2d at 1350-51 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
251. Note, supra note 191, at 151.
252. 657 F.2d at 1355 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). A similar
burden of presenting alternatives as part of defendant's rebuttal was adopted by the Third
Circuit as to housing discrimination in Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978). In that case, the court found that discrimina-
tory acts of officials and agencies in Philadelphia had hindered construction of a low-income
housing project for blacks in violation of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. The
court held that "a justification must serve, in theory and practice, a legitimate, bona fide
interest of the Title VIII defendant, and the defendant must show that no alternative course
of action could be adopted that would enable that interest to be served with less discrimina-
tory impact." 564 F.2d at 149. The standard adopted by the Third Circuit in Rizzo was
later applied by the district court in NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 491 F.
Supp. 290, 315-16 (D. Del. 1980), wherein the court noted a similarity between housing
location decisions and hospital site determinations. In both Rizzo and Medical Center, Inc.,
the appellate court narrowly construed the defendant's burden of presenting evidence of the
absence of less discriminatory alternatives, and merely required a showing that the legiti-
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C. The Second Circuit: A Struggle for Consensus
Within two months of the Supreme Court's decision in Bakke, the
Second Circuit in Board of Education v. Calpfano253 upheld an impact
standard under the Emergency School Aid Act.2 54  The' court noted
that employment discrimination under ESAA also violated Title VI,
holding both to a disproportionate impact standard. Citing Lau, the
Second Circuit analyzed the instant case as an exercise of congressional
spending power, which "here in aid of the Fourteenth Amendment, is
afforded considerable latitude.
255
The following year, the Second Circuit was directly presented with
the issue of the standard to be applied in Title VI adjudication, but this
time within the context of a school desegregation suit. In ParentAssoci-
ation ofAndrew Jackson High School v. Ambach ,256 the court held that
"Title VI does not authorize federal judges to impose a school desegre-
gation remedy where there is no constitutional transgression---.e.,
where a racial imbalance is merely defacto ."257 The court noted that
Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,258 which deals comprehen-
sively with school desegregation, limits the power of the Attorney Gen-
eral to bring desegregation suits to no greater than "'existing powers
.. .to enforce the Equal Protection Clause.' "259 The court concluded
that since the Attorney General and the federal judiciary lack the
power to correct defacto racial imbalances under Title IV, it would
have been illogical for Congress to have intended to grant broader
powers to private litigants under Title VI in the same courts.
mate nondiscriminatory interest justified the rejection of alternative sites. Rizzo, 564 F.2d at
149; Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d at 1333.
253. 584 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1978), affd sub nom. Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130
(1979). The school board of the City of New York sought to enjoin HEW from declaring it
ineligible for federal assistance under ESAA.
254. 20 U.S.C. §§ 3191-3220 (Supp. IV 1980).
255. 584 F.2d at 588 n.38. "But in the exercise of its spending power Congress may be
more protective of given minorities than the Equal Protection Clause itself requires, al-
though the point at which given non-minorities or their members are themselves constitu-
tionally prejudiced remains in doubt even after Bakke. Still, in the alleviation of
discrimination, the effect of congressional findings is not insubstantial." Id
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit opinion in Harris, upholding an im-
pact standard under ESAA, but failed to determine the standard to be applied under Title
VI. See supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
256. 598 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1979). Parents Association was a class action brought on be-
half of high school students alleging that actions and inactions of defendant school officials
had created a dejure segregated facility.
257. Id at 715.
258. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c to 2000c-9 (1981).
259. 598 F.2d at 716 (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
17 (1971); 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1981)) (emphasis in original).
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The court discussed the implications of the Bakke "doctrine of co-
extensiveness" but declined to find that Bakke had expressly overruled
Lau.260 It also distinguished the 1978 Second Circuit opinion in
Calfano as having been based on an impact standard as to employment
discrimination under Title VI. While a different panel in Califano had
drawn an analogy in the context of teacher employment discrimination
to the standards applicable under Title VII, the present panel believed
the more appropriate analogy in the present school desegregation case
to be Title IV,26" ' for which a constitutional standard had been ex-
pressly established by statute. 62
A careful reading of Title IV in its full text, however, casts serious
doubt upon the validity of the Second Circuit's interpretation of the
statute with regard to Title VI implications. The Act does not limit the
Attorney General's authority to bring desegregation suits, but rather
expressly declines to empower government officials such as the Attor-
ney General or the federal judiciary to mandate busing in order to
achieve racial balance or "otherwise to enlarge the existing power of
the court to insure compliance with constitutional standards.26 3
It can reasonably be argued that at the time Title IV was enacted
in 1964, Congress did not contemplate an intent standard under the
Fourteenth Amendment, that standard having not yet been judicially
established. Perhaps the language of Title IV as to "the existing power
of the court," couched within the context of the preceding phrase as to
limitations on busing to achieve racial balance, merely applies to their
powers in fashioning desegregation remedies rather than to standards
applicable in determining a violation in the first place. The counter-
argument would follow that of Title VI interpretation-that the intent
of Congress was to create a standard of review subject to evolving si-
multaneously with Court interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.264  However, absent contradictory evidence as to legislative
intent, the language of the Act as to "existing" judicial power clearly
places the focus upon those constitutional standards applicable in 1964
at the time of the statute's enactment, and should be read, as mentioned
above, to refer to the judicial power to fashion remedial decrees, rather
than to the standard of review to be applied in determining a
260. 598 F.2d at 716.
261. Id
262. See supra note 259.
263. 42 U.S.C. § 2G00c-6(a) (emphasis added).
264. See supra text accompanying note 184.
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violation. 65
Even assuming arguendo that an intent standard governs Title IV,
a clear distinction can be drawn between the legislative purposes of
Titles IV and VI so as to contravene the Second Circuit's interpretation
by analogy. The purpose of Title IV was to relieve the public of the
financial costs of school desegregation litigation by permitting the At-
torney General, upon receipt of a signed complaint, to institute legal
action in order to desegregate public schools and colleges and to pro-
tect constitutional rights.266  The purpose of Title VI, on the other
hand, was to assure that federal funds would not be used to further
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin.2 67 Again,
it can be argued that Congress, under its spending power, can impose
stricter standards for the use of federal monies than those required to
establish constitutional violations in cases not involving federal
financial assistance. Therefore, while Title IV requires an intent stan-
dard to be applied in school desegregation cases, that standard need
not be applied under Title VI, but should operate independently of the
Title VI standard in school desegregation litigation. If it is recognized
that each title of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has a specific purpose
independent of the overall purpose of the Act to "assure equal access
for all Americans to all areas of community life,"2 6 it can be under-
265. It is important to note that the analysis of Title IV suggested herein directly contra-
venes that taken by the Supreme Court in Swann, in which the Court stated: "Once a right
and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy
past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies." Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971). Based upon its interpretation
of the legislative history of the Act, the Court noted that there exists no intention to restrict
those historically broad remedial powers. According to the Court, the underlying concern
expressed by congressional members was that Title IV might be construed as creating a right
of action under the Fourteenth Amendment in the case of "de facto" segregation, that is,
"where racial imbalance exists in the schools but with no showing that this was brought
about by discriminatory action of state authorities." Id at 17-18.
The Court in Swa'n failed to cite the text or content of statements made during con-
gressional debates to support its interpretation of Title IV. But this interpretation provided
the most effective argument to counter plaintiffs' argument that limitations were imposed on
the equity powers of the courts by Title IV, and provided strong support for upholding the
system-wide busing remedy imposed by the district court. The Court in Swann could have
countered the plaintiffs' argument merely by interpreting Title IV as declining to grant such
power to the courts by congressional fiat while not intending to withdraw those equitable
powers traditionally exercised by the courts. In sum, had the Court in Swann interpreted
Title IV as an exercise in congressional restraint, it could have countered the plaintiffs' argu-
ments successfully without seeking alternative grounds in the defacto/dejure distinction.
266. 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2508.
267. See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
268. 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2362-63.
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stood that the Second Circuit was in error in attempting to analogize
from one title to the other as to governing standards of judicial review.
The effect of such a dual standard for Title IV and Title VI deseg-
regation suits is that were the Attorney General to bring an action
under Title IV powers to enforce constitutional rights, an intent stan-
dard would govern and the court could exercise the full range of its
equitable powers within the confines of the Constitution. On the other
hand, were a desegregation action brought under Title VI against a
recipient of federal funds, an impact standard would govern. A distinc-
tion drawn with respect to desegregation cases between governing stan-
dards of review as to constitutional violations on the one hand, and
statutory violations on the other, is no more impractical than the same
distinction that has been drawn with respect to other types of cases,
e.g., employment (Title VII) and housing (Title VIII). The underlying
issues concern congressional purpose and overriding policy
considerations.
The issue of desegregation was again presented before the Second
Circuit the following year, this time compounded by claims of discrimi-
nation against the handicapped and denial of due process. Lora v.
Board of Education2 69 was a class action asserting that the procedures
and facilities provided by the defendant school district for the educa-
tion of emotionally disturbed students violated certain provisions of the
federal Constitution and statutes-among them Title VI. Citing the
overwhelming minority population among students assigned to special
day schools for the emotionally handicapped (68% black, 27% His-
panic, and 5% other), plaintiffs alleged that such special schools served
as segregated "dumping grounds" for minorities, and provided inade-
quate facilities without due process as compared with those afforded
comparable white students in other settings. The district court, citing
Lau, had found a Title VI violation based upon a racially discrimina-
tory effect.
270
The Second Circuit on appeal reversed the district court decision
as to the Title VI claim, citing Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in
Harris as authority for an intent standard under the Act.27' The ma-
jority opinion made no mention of Bakke or its "doctrine of coexten-
siveness." Judge Oakes, who had written the majority opinion in
Califano upholding an effects standard as to Title VI employment
269. 623 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1980).
270. 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1277-78 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
271. 623 F.2d at 250. A brief discussion of the Stewart opinion is set forth S'upra at text
accompanying note 195.
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claims, however, wrote a separate opinion in Lora in which he con-
curred in the result reached by the majority but dissented as to the
standard governing Title VI review. Basing his view upon Bakke, the
dictum in the Harris majority opinion, and Justice Stewart's dissenting
opinion in that case, Judge Oakes was also inclined to apply an intent
standard but declined to do so, awaiting further clarification from the
Court.272 It is worthy of note that neither the majority nor the concur-
ring opinion made any mention of the intent exception as to desegrega-
tion cases carved out by a different panel of the circuit in Andrew
Jackson .273
It could be argued that the language of Lora indicates a general
leaning of the Second Circuit toward a broad Title VI standard of in-
tent to be applied in all cases. One month afterLora, however, a panel
comprised of different judges than those who had decided Calfano,
Andrew Jackson, and Lora, cast some doubt on this observation in a
Title VI case outside the educational arena.
In Bryan v. Koch,274 the district court had applied an intent-ori-
ented standard for prima facie violations under Title VI, requiring at
least some evidence of "a disparate impact probative of discriminatory
motive."275 On appeal, the Second Circuit declined to rule on the stan-
dard governing Title VI. However, in a detailed discussion, the court
found that even under an effects test, the defendant had successfully
countered the plaintiffs' prima facie case by coming forward with a le-
gitimate justification-an increase in efficiency of the municipal hospi-
tal system-and evidence of the criteria applied in the selection of the
site to be closed, which was found to be reasonably related to the prof--
fered justification.276
As to the next step in the impact paradigm--consideration of alter-
native, less discriminatory means-the court limited judicial inquiry in
the context of hospital relocations to an assessment of all the municipal
hospitals in order to select one for closing. According to the Second
Circuit, a sweeping judicial inquiry regarding alternative means to
achieve operational efficiency beyond hospital closings would risk sub-
stituting the judgment- of the court for that of the city's elected officials
and appointed specialists. Such alternatives, the court felt, are "more
272. 623 F.2d at 251-52.
273. See supra notes 256-59 and accompanying text.
274. 492 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980). Plaintiffs in this
case sought a preliminary injunction, alleging that a disproportionate racial impact resulted
from the closing of a municipal hospital.
275. 492 F. Supp. at 236.
276. 627 F.2d at 616-18.
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appropriate for examination by administrative, legislative, and other
political process."277
If the Second Circuit appeared to vacillate between an intent stan-
dard in Lora and an impact standard as suggested in Koch, a case de-
cided by a panel again of a composition totally different from the
panels in the preceding four cases, and just two weeks subsequent to
Koch, merely serves to confuse the circuit's position even further. In
Guardians Association of the New York City Police Department, Inc. v.
Civil Service Commission,27 the district court had applied an effects
standard under a Title VI employment discrimination claim, citing Lau
as authority for upholding administrative regulations requiring an ef-
fects test. The regulations in this case were those promulgated by the
Department of Labor pursuant to Title VI.2 79
The Second Circuit, on appeal, reversed the district court decision,
citing Bakke as authority for an intent standard to be applied under
Title VI, even in the context of employment discrimination. Although
the court acknowledged the Second Circuit's previous decisions up-
holding an effects standard in cases involving administrative regula-
tions28 ° and observing that Bakke did not overrule Lau,2"' Judge
277. Id. at 619. The majority further posited several arguments indicating that it would
support an impact standard were the issue directly before it. First, Lau, which applied an
effects standard, had not been overruled and had been viewed as controlling by the Second
Circuit in Calfano, as well as by other circuit courts. Second, the present case could be
distinguished from Andrew Jackson and Lora, which both involved court-ordered desegre-
gation remedies for which Title IV provides the governing standard as to dejure segregation.
Third, even if an intent standard governs Title VI actions in which fund termination is
sought as a remedy, such a standard may not apply where, as in the present case, the parties
seek an injunction. Fourth, the defendant had contractually bound itself to comply with
administrative regulations that impose an effects test. Id at 616.
278. 466 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted,
454 U.S. 1140 (1982). The case was brought by black and Hispanic members of the New
York City Police Department, alleging that layoffs carried out pursuant to the Department's
"last-hired, first-fired" policy were discriminatory in that the Department's entry level exam-
inations administered between 1968 and 1970 were discriminatory, and that, but for such
discrimination, plaintiffs would have been hired earlier and would have accrued sufficient
seniority to withstand being laid off.
279. 29 C.F.R. § 31.3(c)(1) (1981). The district court further presented a noteworthy in-
terpretation of the Bakke "coextensiveness doctrine" as not indicating a view contrary to
Lau. According to the court, the critical issue in Bakke was whether Title VI prohibits all
racial classifications per se or, like the Equal Protection Clause, only those for which no
compelling justification is proffered. Justice Powell had concluded that the two provisions
were coextensive with respect to their prohibiting only unjustified racial classifications. This
interpretation has no bearing upon the governing standard of review under Title VI. 466 F.
Supp. at 1283-84. See infra notes 284-88 and accompanying text for a more detailed discus-
sion of this interpretation of the doctrine of "coextensiveness."
280. 633 F.2d at 275 n.4 (Coffrin, J., concurring) (citing Caifano).
281. Id (citing Andrew Jackson and Lora).
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Coffrin, enunciating the majority opinion on this issue, interpreted
Bakke as having seriously undercut Lau.282 This case is presently
before the Supreme Court for review,2"3 and represents the Court's first
opportunity to resolve the intent/impact debate as to Title VI or any of
its analogues.
D. Summary
The foregoing cases clearly indicate a post-Bakke sense of confu-
sion and uneasiness among and within the circuits. This confusion is
perhaps most evident in the Second Circuit, which has been faced with
the largest number of cases and broadest range of issues. From this
discord, however, can be extracted a set of approaches and arguments
useful in the formulation of an overall model of judicial review under
Title VI. The following section will draw from the legislative history of
the Act, Supreme Court and lower court interpretations, judicially de-
fined standards in similar statutory and constitutional adjudication, as
well as from the discussion of the intent/impact debate among the legal
community, in order to develop a model of Title VI review. The pro-
posed model aims at maintaining the broad-based utility of the Act,
while balancing the social interest in protecting the rights of historically
disadvantaged groups against the political interest in respecting the in-
tegrity of decisionmaking at the implementation level.
11. A Proposed Model of Judicial Review
A. Interpretation of "Coextensiveness"
The Third Circuit opinion in Medical Center, although riddled
with flaws, accepts the constitutional underpinnings of Title VI as re-
lied upon by the Court in Bakke and as evidenced in the legislative
history of the Act, and provides a starting point for reconciling Lau and
Bakke, two cases that represent on their face irreconcilable Court inter-
pretations of Title VI.284 As one commentator has noted, the facts
presented in Bakke placed the Court in a policy bind with respect to
Lau and the remedial objectives of Title VI.285 Recognition in Bakke
of an impact standard under Title VI would have afforded the statute
broader proscriptive reach than that of the Equal Protection Clause
282. 633 F.2d at 275 (Coffrin, J., concurring).
283. See supra note 278.
284. See supra notes 235-45 and accompanying text. See also Guardians Ass'n v. Civil
Service Comm'n, 466 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
285. Note, Maintaining Health Care in the Inner City: Title VI and Hospital Relocations,
55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 271, 290-91 (1980).
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and would have led to the inevitable position that, while the clause may
tolerate some benign racial preferences to combat the effects of past
societal discrimination, such preferences would be barred by Title VI.
The facts of Lau, however, had presented the Court with contravening
policy considerations exerting pressure in the opposite direction. In an
effort to protect the interests of racial minorities, the Court deferred to
the power of Congress to enact broad-based remedial legislation and to
implement social policy through its spending powers. Viewed in this
perspective, Bakke represents an effort by the Court to protect the re-
medial objectives of Title VI. The "doctrine of coextensiveness" suc-
cessfully achieved that end with regard to voluntary efforts to remedy
past discrimination. The key issue in Bakke was not whether the medi-
cal school's practices were discriminatory, for they were clearly so on
their face, but whether benign intentions could justify such discrimina-
tion. The Court's invocation of equal protection standards, on the
other hand, sacrificed the utility of Title VI with regard to facially neu-
tral practices that disproportionately burden a minority group. Therein
lay the dilemma of the Court in Bakke.
The distinction drawn by the Third Circuit in Medical Center as to
the type of racial classification at issue-remedial with a benign pur-
pose, as opposed to facially neutral with a racially disproportionate im-
pact--can be carried further to reach a novel yet plausible
interpretation of Bakke. The Court's overriding concern in Bakke was
with racial criteria, and the threshold question was whether benign ra-
cial classifications would be barred by Title VI.286 It can be argued that
by placing the Title VI proscription within the confines of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Court was merely subjecting all racial classifi-
cations, whether facially discriminatory but remedial in the Bakke
sense or facially neutral but with disproportionate racial impact in the
Lau sense, to a strict scrutiny analysis. According to this interpreta-
tion, the Court was stating that racial classifications in any sense are
permissible only where the government can proffer a compelling objec-
tive, where the classification is strictly necessary to promote that objec-
tive, and where there exist no alternative less discriminatory means to
achieve those ends. 287 The focus is thereby placed on a means-end
286. 438 U.S. 265, 304 (Powell, J.) (quoting Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 570-71 (Stew-
art, J., concurring in result)).
287. The doctrine of "strict scrutiny" has been developed through a line of cases since
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Notable cases include Sugarman v. Dou-
gall, 414 U.S. 634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967); and Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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analysis to define the contours of justifiable classifications, and Bakke
comes to signify that those contours are coterminous for Title VI and
the Equal Protection Clause. In that sense, Bakke can be said to have
overruled Lau. Proof of discriminatory effects would no longer suffice
to establish a Title VI violation per se, but would merely raise the pre-
sumption of discrimination, shifting the burden of persuasion to the
defendant to rebut that presumption with a compelling governmental
interest. This test is consistent with the rule as applied in disparate
impact cases under Title VII.2 88 In education cases, the compelling
governmental interest would translate into "educational necessity,"
similar to the "business necessity" rule of Title VII. Once the defend-
ant comes forward with such rebuttal evidence, the plaintiff may offer
evidence of alternative less discriminatory means that would meet such
"necessity."
B. Establishing the Prima Facie Case
The legislative history of Title VI indicates a failure on the part of
Congress to reach a consensus on the definition of "discrimination"
under the Act,28 9 and thereby offers inconclusive evidence on congres-
sional intent as to whether Title VI prohibits merely those racial classi-
fications resulting from intentional acts of fund recipients, or includes
those resulting from facially neutral acts that bear a disproportionate
racial impact. While there exists evidence of the intended constitu-
tional underpinnings of the Act,290 there is scant support for the argu-
ment that the standard of review under Title VI was intended to evolve
with that of judicial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
291
Congressional debates surrounding passage of the Act, however, sup-
port the proposition that Title VI proscriptions would be defined by
each agency within the context of the agency's programs and scope of
power.292 Given the effects standard as established by HEW regula-
tions under Title VI,293 and given a plausible interpretation of "coex-
tensiveness" outside the framework of an intent standard, it is
suggested that an effects standard be applied in Title VI disparate im-
pact cases following the Title VII three-tier model of analysis, but with
slight modification.
288. See, e.g., supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (discussion of Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)).
289. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
291. See supra text accompanying note 265.
292. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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Case law indicates two significant components of the prima facie
case under Title VI. First, the racial disparity created by the chal-
lenged governmental action must be substantial and statistically verifi-
able,294 as well as measurable, definite, and greater than the impact on
others absent such action.295 Second, the effect on the minority group
must be sufficiently adverse. As to the first component, because Title
VI covers a broad range of governmental policies and practices, it is
suggested that a flexible standard regarding substantiality be applied
on a case-by-case basis.296 However, the "substantiality" requirement
imposes a heavy burden upon the plaintiff of presenting evidence that
is measurable and far more than de minimis. As to the requirement of
"adversity," the plaintiff must not merely prove statistical disparity, but
must further prove that the overall effect of the disproportionate impact
is of considerable consequence to the protected group.
Several lower courts have applied a standard of "effective foreclo-
sure," citing Lau for its holding that the failure of the San Francisco
School District to provide Chinese-speaking students with an opportu-
nity to acquire basic minimal skills effectively "foreclosed" those stu-
dents from obtaining meaningful education.297 This standard contains
both an element of "adequacy" and of "appropriateness." Plaintiffs
must prove that the challenged governmental actions would result, or
have resulted, in the provision of services so inadequate or so inappro-
priate to their needs as to be meaningless, or the functional equivalent
of no services at all.
The suggested emphasis upon the substantiality and adversity of
the harm serves to protect fund recipients from an overbroad effects
standard that might invalidate official actions that produce only mini-
mally harmful results. In the educational arena, for example, decisions
on the placement of teachers and students, site selections, school clos-
294. See Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 616-17 (2d Cir. 1980).
295. See NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1332 (3d Cir. 1981).
296. See Note, supra note 191, at 143-44 nn.109-14, for a discussion of standards applied
in Title VI cases.
297. Lau, 414 U.S. at 566. See also Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926, 964-65 (N.D. Cal.
1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-4027 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 1980) (court held that disproportionate
placement of minority students in classes for educable mentally retarded constituted Title VI
violation, as such a policy effectively foreclosed them from any meaningful education); Jack-
son v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896, 904 (E.D. Mo. 1979), afl'd, 620 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1980)
(hospital closing case, in which court, citing Lau, denied plaintiffs' motion for preliminary
injunction since plaintiffs failed to show that consolidation of certain services would effec-
tively foreclose them from all hospital services). The Lau standard of "effective foreclosure"
from "meaningful" education was further cited by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits respectively
in Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elementary School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022, 1029-30
(9th Cir. 1978), and Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147, 1152-54 (10th Cir. 1974).
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ings, course offerings, and provision of instructional services are all po-
tential targets of Title VI claims. Such limits upon the scope of judicial
review are necessary in order to preserve administrative efficiency.298
C. Burden of Justification
Under principles established by the Court in Title VII cases, once
the plaintiff has proven the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
defendant, who may rebut with evidence that the employment practice
is "job related" or otherwise dictated by "business necessity."2 99 If the
defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must then prove the availa-
bility of alternative means that would have served the employer's legiti-
mate interest while avoiding undesirable racial effects.3" The model
suggested here modifies this three-step operational framework in order
to meet the broader purpose of Title VI, that is, to assure that the in-
tended beneficiaries of federal funds have equal opportunity to enjoy
program benefits.
Returning to the suggested interpretation of "coextensiveness': if
read to be confined to the arena of equal protection means-end analy-
sis, the doctrine merely prohibits those racial classifications that cannot
be justified by a compelling interest or can be avoided by less discrimi-
natory means. In conformity with this interpretation, the proposed
model under Title VI would require that the defendant sustain its bur-
den of justification with evidence of a compelling interest. This model
superimposes Title VII analysis upon equal protection analysis. Trans-
lated into educational terminology, the justification of "business neces-
sity" becomes "educational necessity" of the magnitude of a
"compelling interest."301 The standard of "compelling" places a heav-
298. Where the impact is so substantial and so directly the result of the challenged ac-
tion, then a "strong inference" of discriminatory purpose attaches and the distinction be-
tween intent and effects is blurred. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 422 U.S. 256, 279
n.25 (1979). The suggested standards of "substantiality" and "adversity" fall short of this
point.
299. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
300. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
301. Cf. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975) (Eighth Circuit, in considering claim under Title VIII of Civil
Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1981), developed three-part test of com-
pelling interest. Defendant must show: (1) action advanced public interest; (2) interest is
lawful and sufficiently substantial to outweigh harm to plaintiffl and (3) interest could not be
served by less discriminatory means). But see Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1980)
(court proposed merely a "rational relationship" test as to defendant's justification). The
Eighth Circuit measured the justification as "compelling," using a balancing approach simi-
lar to that used in recent Supreme Court decisions under the Equal Protection Clause. See,
e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brink-
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ier burden upon the defendant fund recipient in Title VI cases than
upon the defendant employer under Title VII. This higher standard, as
well as the required discussion of alternatives, is justifiable as a means
of preventing the misuse of federal funds and of imposing upon recipi-
ents a higher standard of care in decisionmaking.
The final step in the proposed model is judicial consideration of
alternatives. As suggested by the separate opinion of Judge Gibbons in
Medical Center, a spending power statute such as Title VI must place a
greater burden on the defendant to justify the redistribution of federal
funds away from the intended beneficiaries.3 "2 Furthermore, as stated
previously, such a rule would encourage federal fund recipients to
weigh the potential racial impact of various alternatives prior to formu-
lating and implementing educational policy, and would place the bur-
den of presenting such alternatives upon the parties with greatest access
to the information. °3
Conclusion
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was designed to prevent
the use of federal funds to promote discriminatory purposes, and to
assure that such funds provide equal opportunity to the intended bene-
ficiaries. In the past two decades, the Act has served as the basis for
litigation involving employment, educational policies and practices,
and hospital relocations. Perhaps the broadest range of issues brought
before the courts under Title VI has concerned education-from segre-
gative policies on teacher and student assignment, to school closings,
the use of I.Q. tests, the placement of students in special education pro-
grams, and the adequacy of instructional services provided to linguistic
minority students.
In recent years, the continued ability of Title VI to fulfill its legis-
lative purposes has been placed in serious jeopardy, stemming from the
Supreme Court's decision in Bakke and the resulting confusion in the
man, 443 U.S. 526 (1979). One commentator has proposed that the following factors be
weighed by the court under a balancing test: the degree of disproportion in the impact; the
efficiency of the challenged law; the availability of alternative means having less dispropor-
tionate impact; and the governmental objective sought to be advanced. See Perry, supra
note 68, at 559-60. The order in which evidence is produced in the course of the litigation
would necessitate that defendant show alternative, less discriminatory means together with
evidence of justification in order for the court's balancing of all four factors to bear on the
question of a "compelling" justification.
302. 657 F.2d 1322, 1353 (3d Cir. 1981) (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
303. See supra notes 250-52 and accompanying text.
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circuit courts over the "doctrine of coextensiveness." This article has
attempted to develop a model of Title VI analysis that is consistent
with prior Court decisions as to the standard of review to be applied
under the Act, with legislative history, with the reasoning of the Court
in Bakke and subsequent decisions, and with sound policy considera-
tions regarding the proper subjects of judicial inquiry and the preserva-
tion of reasoned decisionmaking at the implementation level.
The proposed model superimposes the three-tiered level of review
developed by the Court in Title VII cases, upon the means-end analysis
of equal protection adjudication. Utilizing the shifting burdens of pro-
duction as developed under Title VII, plaintiff may establish the prima
facie case under Title VI with proof of substantially disproportionate
impact upon, as well as adverse harm to, members of the protected
group. Defendant may offer rebuttal evidence of a compelling justifi-
cation (e.g, educational necessity), and the absence of alternative, less
discriminatory means to promote the justification. This allocation of
burdens of proof and production safeguards federal fund recipients
from claims of minimal harm, while placing the burden of coming for-
ward with the evidence on the parties with most ready access to the
information.

